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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2A-
3(2)0) (1996). As the final judgment of the Eighth Judicial District Court, this appeal is taken 
as of right pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court err in holding that Syscom was not a contractor under the Utah 
Construction Trades Licensing Act, and was therefore not barred from suing for materials and 
services? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This legal determination is reviewed for correctness. Jones. 
Waldo, et al. v. Dawson. 298 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 11 (Utah 1996). (Issue preserved for review 
at R. 959.) 
2. Did the Court err in refusing to find that Syscom had breached various material 
duties and obligations under the Management Agreement, and was therefore not entitled to 
recover? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This legal determination is reviewed for correctness. Jones. 
Waldo, et al. v. Dawson. 298 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 11 (Utah 1996). (Issue preserved for review 
at R. 959.) 
3. Did the Court err in finding that Cellcom had breached the Management Agreement 
by failing to communicate with Syscom? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This finding of fact is reviewed under the clearly erroneous 
standard. Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. Citv of St. George. 898 P.2d 1372, 1378 (Utah 1995). 
4. Did the Court err in refusing to reopen to consider additional evidence, or to order 
a new trial on the basis of its own legal error, or, as an additional ground, the discovery of 
additional evidence showing Sy scorn's breach caused Cellcom to suffer millions of dollars in 
damages? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: These decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Issue 
preserved for review at R. 1040, 1097.) 
5. Did the Court err in refusing to recuse when his former firm's representation of 
Syscom in a transaction related to this lawsuit created the appearance of impartiality? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This legal determination is reviewed for correctness. Jones. 
Waldo, et al. v. Dawson. 298 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 10 (Utah 1996). (Issue preserved for review 
atR. 1051.) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act, § 58-55-101, et seq. (1995). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-1(1) (1953, as amended). 
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Canons 2 and 3. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a contract action arising from the construction of a cellular telephone system in 
eastern Utah. In 1989, American Rural Cellular ("Cellcom" or "ARC") had earned Federal 
Communications Commission ("FCC") permits to build cellular systems in eastern Utah (Utah-5), 
and in central Pennsylvania (PA-11). Cellcom hired Syscom to construct one Mobile Telephone 
Switching Office (MTSO), and two cell sites, each with a building, towers, access road, fencing 
and large antennae in eastern Utah. As the first phase of construction neared completion, Syscom 
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had expended all of the ftmds budgeted to construct the three sites and run the system for the 
ensuing nine months. 
Cellcom asked Syscom to account for the monies spent, so that Cellcom could avoid 
default by accounting to its lender, Motorola. Syscom responded by filing three mechanic's liens 
claiming $89,000, plus attorney's fees. Cellcom filed this action for breach of contract, to 
terminate the contract, and to void the mechanic's liens. Syscom counterclaimed for more money 
it claimed was owing. 
After a bench trial in October, 1992 the court held that: (1) Syscom had breached the 
contract but the breach was de minimis; (2) Cellcom was justified in terminating the contract but 
that no damages resulted to Cellcom; and (3) entered judgment on the Counterclaim, awarding 
Syscom its attorney's fees and a judgment for $116,040.96. Cellcom appealed. 
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded on the issue of whether Syscom was entitled 
to recover. American Rural Cellular Inc. v. Systems Communications Corp.. et al.. 890 P.2d 
1035 (Utah App. 1995) (Cellcom D. Holding that the Court's Findings of Fact were woefully 
deficient and that its Conclusions of Law were in error, it reversed and remanded with detailed 
instructions. 
Upon remand, the Court entered judgment on September 18, 1995, again holding that 
Syscom was not a contractor under the Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act and was entitled 
to recover from Cellcom. The Court added to the judgment amounts not awarded in the first 
judgment, added interest and increased the award of attorney's fees to Syscom. 
Cellcom then learned that before Judge Anderson took the bench his two-person law firm 
had represented Syscom and its president, Rodney Hauer, in a stock purchase transaction related 
to this lawsuit. Cellcom moved the Court to recuse itself. Cellcom also moved to reopen the case 
for the submission of additional evidence under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59, and in the 
alternative, moved for a new trial, on the basis of legal error and the discovery of new evidence 
of the numerous deficiencies in the work Sy scorn had performed, and the millions of dollars of 
consequential damages caused by Syscom's failure to account for the money it had expended. 
Syscom's breach lead to Cellcom's lender foreclosing on the PA-11 permit, property and assets. 
The Court denied all Cellcom's motions, including the Motion to Recuse. This appealed 
followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In 1989, American Rural Cellular, Inc. (Cellcom) was awarded FCC construction 
permits to construct cellular systems in eastern Utah (Utah-5), and in central Pennsylvania (PA-
11). (R. 531,754.) 
2. Cellcom was formed in the mid-1980's in order to pursue cellular telephone 
construction permits from the FCC. (R. 1368; Dennis O'Neill Aff., f 3, attached to plaintiffs 
Memorandum of Law Supporting its Rule 59 Motions and therein offered; rejected by Court's 
Ruling, November 9, 1995; R. 1307.) To qualify for the construction permits Cellcom spent 
approximately $125,000 (of which $84,600 was for FCC filing fees) to demonstrate to the FCC 
that it was capable of constructing and operating a cellular telephone system. (Id, at 1 4.) Only 
after many months of endeavor to meet FCC standards did Cellcom qualify for the permit lottery. 
(ULatf 5.) 
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3. After obtaining a Utah Construction permit from the FCC, Cellcom approached 
Systems Communications, Inc. (Syscom) and negotiated a contract wherein Syscom would build 
and then help manage the Utah-5 system. (Ex.1, R. 532.) 
4. Mr. Sorensen, President of Syscom, testified that "we were a telephone and radio 
company as well as we did a lot of other forms of technical, wireless communications. We built 
supervisory control and data acquisition. We built sites for ourselves and for others. We installed 
antennas, transmission lines, we did microwave radio communications point-to-point." (R. 552.) 
5. No one at Syscom had any experience operating a cellular system. Mr. Sorensen 
was trained at Cellcom's expense to manage and maintain the technical aspects of the system. 
(R. 771.) 
6. Syscom was not a partner of or a joint venturer with Cellcom. (R. 727.) 
7. No officer, director or employee of Cellcom had any experience in the construction 
trades or construction business. (R. 546-47.) 
8. Before contracting with Syscom, Cellcom negotiated with several equipment 
vendors, including Motorola, that offered to lend construction, equipment and operating funds to 
Cellcom; Cellcom chose Motorola. (R. 544.) 
9. Cellcom's projects in Utah-5 and PA-11 were financed by Motorola, Inc. Before 
gaining financing, Cellcom had to submit, among other things, a detailed business plan to 
Motorola, including construction and operation costs. (R. 546-547.) 
10. Cellcom asked Syscom to submit a complete and detailed bid for what it would cost 
to construct two cell sites and one MTSO. (R. 544, 545.) Cellcom told Syscom to be as specific 
as possible with its bid. (R. 618.) Syscom understood that Cellcom would rely on Syscom's bid 
when it submitted its business plan to Motorola. (R. 545, 546, 760.) Syscom submitted a detailed 
bid to Cellcom, stating that it would construct the three sites for $205,477. (R. 545; Ex. 5.) 
Syscom agreed to build the three sites for the bid amount. (R. 618, 620.) Cellcom relied on and 
submitted Syscom's bid to Motorola as part of Cellcom's business plan. (R. 544, 546, 618.) 
Cellcom received the funding from Motorola, and believed the financing, based on Syscom's bid, 
would be sufficient to construct the system and fund operations for one year. (R. 546, 566.) 
11. Cellcom and Syscom reduced their contract to a written Management Agreement, 
which was Trial Exhibit 1 and Trial Exhibit 75, a copy of which is the first document in the 
Addendum to this Brief. It provided, inter alia, that Cellcom was an independent contractor with 
certain enumerated performance obligations. 
12. Syscom's compensation was specified in the Management Agreement. (Trial Exs. 
1 & 75; Addendum hereto.) 
13. The Management Agreement provided that: "Syscom shall, at its own expense, 
provide a telephone line with a unique telephone number listed in the local telephone listings as 
the telephone number of the Cellular Business." (Id, p. 10) (emphasis added). 
14. The Management Agreement stated how Cellcom could terminate the Management 
Agreement. (Id. at % 10.) 
15. Cellcom contracted with Syscom to build the sites because Syscom convinced 
Cellcom that it could construct the sites within budget. Marie Bagshaw of Cellcom testified that: 
[t]hey had actually - they built their own buildings. They showed us buildings that 
they had built to put up at the cell sites. They had erected towers. They had crews 
to do that . . . They had a building in their back room or their work area, their 
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garage area, that they showed us that they had constructed (Ex. 4) . . . . One they 
had constructed and was going to be using for another site. One of their radio 
sites, two way or a microwave. This is a building that is the same type of building 
that would use for cellular to install your equipment. . . They represented to us 
that they could build that building. (R. 540-541; Ex. 4.) 
16. Ms. Bagshaw testified that Neal Sorensen, Syscom's President, 
had represented to us that - you know - his people were qualified to help build the 
system and to help construct the buildings and whatever needed to be done, [and 
that] that was always the understanding that we had that their crew would be used 
as needed to construct the system." (R. 540.) 
17. Mr. Sorensen told Cellcom that he had personally constructed buildings and towers 
suitable for Cellcom's purposes, in order to convince Cellcom to enter into the Management 
Agreement. (R.541, 543, 757, 800.) Mr. Sorensen testified that "in 1989 Cellcom reviewed 
companies locally to help them construct the business. Evidently we satisfied them that we could 
perform the services that they required." (R. 753.) Mr. Sorensen testified that in the Fall of 1989 
"I convinced them that I could do this for them. I sold Syscom services to them." (R.757.) 
Cellcom relied on Syscom's competence inferred from its representations that it was a contractor 
that could build the sites. (R. 541, 543, 757.) 
18. Syscom subsequently hired subcontractors and materialmen to build the three sites, 
including Dennis Martinsen, Jackson Insulation and Construction, Earl's Fencing, D&D Electric, 
Larry Allred, Swain's, Freestone Construction, Web Crane and others. (R. 703, 708-711.) 
19. The system had to be minimally operational by October 5, 1990, and it was. 
(R. 626.) 
20. Syscom directly paid the persons and materialmen who worked on the sites. 
Syscom never asked for authorization to make any construction-related expenditure or to pay 
anyone. Syscom alone decided how to spend the construction money. (R. 570, 657.) 
21. No officer or employee of Syscom had ever been a licensed contractor or licensed 
electrician, either before or during the construction. (R. 723 -724.) 
22. Syscom listed itself as the owner of and general contractor for the Asphalt Ridge 
cell site on the building permit application for that site. (R. 724 -726; Ex. 56.) On the same 
application, Syscom listed itself as the electrical contractor for the Asphalt Ridge cell site. Id. 
Again, on the Blue Bench cell site building permit application, Syscom listed itself as the owner 
of and general contractor and electrical contractor for the site. (R. 727, Ex. 57.) 
23. Syscom was paid the $10,000 a month to, among other things, have Mr. Sorensen 
manage construction, which funds were withdrawn from the construction account, with respect 
to which "you could only do a draw down after you had completed a phase of the construction." 
(R. 547-548.) 
24. It was the parties' understanding that the $10,000 monthly fee was for Syscom and 
its employees to construct, operate and maintain the system. (R. 578-582, 631, 632, Ex. 1.) 
25. Mr. Sorensen managed the construction of buildings and towers. He was "out 
there working with the crews," and was the "responsible [person] from Syscom to see that the 
cellular system was constructed." (T. 578-582.) 
26. Long before construction began, an East Coast engineering firm conducted radio 
frequency studies to determine the best locations for the cell sites and MTSO. (R. 532, 559.) 
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There is no evidence that Syscom was supervised by a licensed general contractor, licensed 
engineer, architect, Cellcom, or anyone, when it built the sites. 
27. Before beginning construction, Mr. Sorensen determined ownership of the land 
where the engineers had determined the site should be located. He also employed a local 
engineering firm to plan how to get power lines to the sites. (R. 763.) 
28. Motorola lent Cellcom enough money to construct the first phase of the system and 
operate it for a year after conipletion of the first phase. (Ex. 14, R. 566, 654.) It would take five 
years to complete the entire system that would cover Duchesne, Uintah, Daggett, Carbon, Emery 
and Grand counties. (R. 567, 772) 
29. A total of $488,258.93 was available to Syscom. Of this, $30,000 was wired to 
Cellcom's FCC attorney in Washington, D.C., $81,740 was wired to Cellcom officers for salaries 
and expenses (R. 558), leaving $376,518.93 to construct the first phase of the system and to 
operate it for one year. (Ex 14, R. 668.) 
30. Syscom helped Motorola install switches and cell site equipment (R. 769); Syscom 
arranged for an outside billing company to manage the subscriber billings. (R. 770.) 
31. A condition of Cellcom's financing agreement with Motorola required Cellcom to 
submit quarterly accountings to Motorola detailing how each dollar borrowed from Motorola had 
been used. (R. 564.) In turn, a condition of Syscom's contract with Cellcom required Syscom 
to prepare detailed financial reports about the construction and operation of the system. (R. 537-
538, 813, Ex. 1, pp. 3-4.) 
32. Syscom had Cellcom's funds at its disposal. Syscom was supposed to set up a 
construction account and a capital account in Cellcom's name, but never did; instead it established 
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accounts in Syscom's name only. (R. 537, 564.) Syscom received monthly checking account 
statements, yet Syscom never forwarded any monthly statements to Cellcom. (R. 564-566.) 
33. The first quarterly accounting was due in October 1990, the second in January 
1991. (R. 637, 655.) 
34. On several occasions, as to the accounting Syscom was supposed to do, Cellcom 
asked Syscom to submit invoices and bank records so it could account to Motorola as to how the 
funds had been spent. (R. 568, 570.) Syscom failed and refused to keep Cellcom appraised of 
how the funds were expended as the system was built. (R. 538-539.) 
35. In late November 1990, Syscom informed Cellcom that it was nearly out of money. 
(R. 569.) This notification was the first that Cellcom knew that funds were getting low. (R. 569, 
657.) 
36. In late November or early December 1990, Ms. Bagshaw telephoned Mr. Sorensen 
at least twice and informed him that the receipts he had supplied were incomplete, and that 
without complete information she could not account to Motorola. (R. 607.) Mr. Sorensen 
promised to comply. (R. 607.) He sent some information, but never enough to account for the 
monies spent. (R. 637-638.) 
37. Mr. Sorensen knew Syscom had a contractual obligation to provide detailed 
financial reports to Cellcom. (R. 813.) He admitted that the financial information he submitted 
to Cellcom was incomplete and inadequate. (R. 814.) Syscom's bookkeeper was never instructed 
to send any invoices or receipts to Cellcom. (R. 836-837.) 
38. In November 1990, and again in February 1991, Cellcom attempted to account to 
Motorola for the funds and submitted what information it had, but Motorola rejected it. 
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(R. 568, 655.) Motorola refused to provide any more funding to Cellcom unless and until it 
properly accounted for the funds. (R.567-568.) Mr. Sorensen knew that Motorola could not 
understand and was dissatisfied with the financial documents that Syscorn had submitted. (R. 812-
813.) 
39. In mid-January, Mr. Dennis O'Neill, President of Cellcom, instructed 
Ms. Bagshaw not to telephone Mr. Sorensen. (R.605.) She was not instructed to not return 
Mr. Sorensen's calls or write to him. (R. 605.) In January 1991, Ms. Bagshaw traveled from 
her Florida office to visit Sy scorn in Vernal. She asked to see invoices, bank statements, and 
other documents so Cellcom could do the accounting that Sy scorn was supposed to have done. 
Mr. Sorensen told her he did not have the information, that he had mailed it to her at Cellcom's 
Florida address. She did not receive anything from Syscom through the mail until mid-February, 
and only after additional written and oral demands. (R. 616-617.) 
40. On February 7, 1991, Ms. Bagshaw sent a certified letter to Neal Sorensen, again 
asking for a complete accounting and for all underlying documents. (Ex. 18, R. 570.) On 
February 11, 1991, Syscom acknowledged receipt of the letter and wrote back agreeing to submit 
the information, admitting that Cellcom "ha[d] every right to this information." (Ex. 19, R. 571.) 
41. On March 1, 1991, Ms. Bagshaw telephoned Mr. Sorensen to discuss a variety of 
topics. She informed him that Cellcom was not happy with Syscom's performance. (R. 606.) 
42. On March 8, 1991, Syscom filed three mechanic's liens on the property it had 
improved. (Ex. 49, 50, 51.) Once the liens were filed, Motorola threatened to declare the 
financing agreement with Cellcom in default unless Cellcom took the system over from Syscom. 
(R. 573.) 
43. On March 20, 1991, Cellcom, exercising its rights under the Management 
Agreement, took the system over and relieved Syscom of its duties based on at least three 
grounds: (1) Syscom failed to follow Cellcom's directives; (2) Syscom spent excessive amounts 
of money; and (3) Syscom sold a competing product. (R. 568, 572, 578; Ex. 22.) 
44. The financial records turned over by Syscom after the March 20, 1991, takeover 
were incomplete, and Cellcom could not determine what had been purchased by Syscom and 
where the money had been spent. (R. 579.) 
45. Syscom never properly accounted for how it spent the money at any time between 
July 1990 (when construction began) and March 1991, or at any time thereafter. (R. 638, 817.) 
46. The first phase of the system construction was more or less substantially completed 
sometime in January 1991. (R. 807.) However, additional monies had to be spent on equipment 
to complete the system after Cellcom ended the contract. This equipment should have been 
installed by Syscom as part of constructing the system. (R. 662.) 
47. During the time Syscom operated the system for Cellcom, it solicited all of 
Cellcom's customers by including a brochure with Cellcom's billing statement for its subscribers 
that advertised a non-cellular two-way radio sold by Syscom, in direct violation of the Sales Agent 
Agreement and the Management Agreement. (R. 574-575; 649; 727-734, 740; Ex. 61.) Syscom 
agreed that the ad encouraged customers to not use cellular phones. (R. 728.) 
48. Mr. Sorensen claimed that goods and services reflected in the invoices were actually 
received by Cellcom. (R. 799.) 
. 1 9 . 
49. Bills from suppliers and others arising from building and operating the system were 
paid by Syscom with Cellcom's money. The bills were not paid for with Syscom's money. 
(R. 821.) 
50. When Cellcom took over the system on March 20, 1991, the system was operating, 
but numerous problems were later discovered. The electrical wiring at the Blue Bench, Asphalt 
Ridge and MTSO sites was done in violation of the National Electric Code. (R. 603.) The billing 
system did not work, as the master codes had been removed, requiring at least a week's time to 
reprogram. (Ex. 48, R. 601.) Mr. Sorensen claims that the billing system was working when 
Syscom turned the system back to Cellcom. (R. 795.) Three expensive antennas purchased by 
Syscom with Cellcom's money were not given back to Cellcom. (R. 603-604.) 
51. Syscom was obligated under the Management Agreement to set up roaming 
agreements with other cellular and land line telephone companies. No roaming agreements were 
set up by Syscom. (R. 643; Ex. 1, 75.) 
52. The Management Agreement provided that Syscom would build and then operate 
the system for five years in exchange for $10,000 a month. Syscom was to receive $600,000 for 
these services over this period. (Ex. 1, 75.) 
53. The Management Agreement provided that Syscom would perform all listed 
services, including constructing the system, for a monthly flat fee. When the contract was 
negotiated, there were no discussions relating to Syscom charging Cellcom separately for the work 
of Syscom's employees or technicians. (R. 580-581, 761.) Cellcom never agreed to or 
understood that the Management Agreement would permit Syscom to charge Cellcom for its own 
employees' time. The $10,000 a month fee was for Syscom's services, including the services of 
its employees. (R. 531-532, 580-581.) Before Cellcom took over the system on March 20, 
1991, it was never informed by Syscom that it was charging Cellcom for the time of its 
employees. (R. 656.) The invoices reflecting "tech hour" (or employee) charges offered no detail 
of how hundreds of hours of "technicians'" time had been spent. (R. 555-557; Ex. 2, 10, 13.) 
Mr. Sorensen said he never billed Cellcom for his time as tech hours. (R. 719.) Mr. Sorensen 
thought the tech hours were allowed under t 4(a) of the Management Agreement. (R. 718.) 
Syscom improperly charged and received from Cellcom $32,072.50 for hours worked by Syscom 
employees, and for hours worked by Neal Sorensen himself. The tech hours were not part of 
Syscom's bid to build the system. (R. 621.) Syscom prepared no billings or reimbursement 
requests for tech hours until after the contract had been terminated on March 20, 1991. (R. 656, 
714; Exs. 25, 33, 34, 35, 37, 42, 43.) 
54. The Management Agreement (f f 3, 10) expressly provided that Syscom would "at 
its own expense" provide telephone services and office services to Cellcom. Consequently, its 
claims against Cellcom for its own telephone and office expenses were not paid by Cellcom. 
55. Syscom's request for reimbursement of $1,713.67, as reflected on Exhibit 27, is 
proper to the extent that it was for travel expense reimbursement. (R. 645, Ex. 27.) It was not 
paid because Syscom had spent all the money. Likewise, the charge for $1,760.00, as reflected 
on Exhibit 28, is proper insofar as it was for equipment and parts. However, $326.00 worth of 
parts, as reflected on Exhibit 28, was never received. The balance was not paid because Syscom 
had spent all the money. (R. 646; Ex. 28.) Subscriber fees for customers were obtained in 
amounts of $4,800 and $2,258.01 were payable, but were not paid because Syscom had not 
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identified the identity of the subscribers, and had spent all the money. (R. 647-648; Ex. 30 and 
31.) 
56. Cellcom assumed control of the system on the morning of March 20, 1991. On 
that same day, Neal Sorensen withdrew $4,237.20, the balance then present in the Cellcom bank 
accounts, without Cellcom's knowledge, permission or authority. (R. 598,740-744; Exs. 65, 66.) 
57. Syscom failed to account for the money it expended. There was $376,518.93 
available to Syscom at the inception of the project. Relying on Syscom's bid to construct the sites 
for $205,477, Motorola budgeted $220,000 for construction, plus $10,000 per month for twelve 
months [October 1990 through September 1991], or $120,000, a total of $340,000 to construct 
and operate the system. (R. 547, 624, 654, 655, 662, 668; Ex. 14.) In November 1990 Syscom 
had run out of money, expending over $376,518.93. (R. 569.) When Syscom exhausted the 
funding, there should have been enough money to pay the $10,000-per-month fee for another ten 
months, plus $36,500 surplus that the original funding provided. (R. 547, 569, 624, 662.) 
Syscom provided no accounting of how this $136,500 was expended or why none of it was 
available. (Ex. 73; R. 638, 814.) Nor did Syscom account for how the construction funds were 
expended. (R. 669.) Even at trial Syscom still presented no sufficient documentary evidence 
accounting for how these funds were expended. (R. 538; Ex. 73 and 74.) Ledgers, seen for the 
first time at trial (Ex. 73, 74), did not include invoices, a beginning balance or an ending balance. 
(R. 638, 814.) Mr. Sorensen admitted that the ledgers were not sufficient to conduct an 
accounting. (R. 814.) 
58. The dollar amounts listed on the three mechanic's liens were derived from invoices 
that Syscom claimed reflected monies owed it by Cellcom. (R. 826-827; Ex. 76.) In reviewing 
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the invoices, Mr. Sorensen could not tell which invoice listed service or materials improved which 
site. (R. 673-677.) 
59. Syscorn failed to negotiate landline interconnection agreements, or perform many 
other contract duties, including negotiating for roaming agreements. (R. 774.) Mr. Sorensen said 
he completed the interconnection agreements. (R. 777.) 
60. Marie Bagshaw was an employee of Cellcom from 1989 until 1993. (R. 1396, 
Affidavit of Dennis O'Neill f 2, offered with Plaintiffs Rule 59 motions; evidence rejected by 
Court's Ruling, November 9, 1995, R. 1307.) 
61. During that period, she had control and possession of documents associated with 
the Utah-5 market. She was the only Cellcom employee with knowledge of Sy scorn's activities. 
She was the only witness for Cellcom during the October 1992 bench trial. (Id. at % 3.) She was 
Cellcom's representative in Utah for purposes of this litigation. She was to have assisted 
Cellcom's attorneys in their preparation of the case. (Id. at 1f 4.) 
62. In 1993, long after the trial was completed, Mr. Dennis O'Neill discovered that 
Marie Bagshaw had purposefully deceived him with regard to Utah-5 operations. Among other 
things, she had failed to inform Cellcom's attorneys of facts directly relevant to the litigation with 
Syscom, including gross accounting irregularities and problems with the cellular system that she 
discovered after Cellcom had assumed control of the system in March 1991. (Id. at f 5.) 
63. Ms. Bagshaw's deception of Mr. O'Neill and Cellcom's attorneys prevented them 
from discovering relevant evidence about Syscom's improper activities, breach of contract, and 
other evidence relevant to this litigation. As a result, Cellcom was unable to present a complete 
case in October of 1992. (M, at 1 6.) 
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64. O'Neill has had a relationship with Motorola since 1985 and was not introduced 
to Motorola by Neal Sorensen. (R. 1369, Affidavit of Dennis O'Neill, % 7, offered with 
Cellcom's Rule 59 motions; rejected by court in its Nov. 9, 1995 Ruling, R. 1307.) In order to 
file applications for the FCC lottery, Cellcom took many steps to qualify for financing with 
Motorola. (KL at 1 10.) 
65. Upon earning the right to construct the cellular systems in Utah-5 and PA-11, 
Cellcom entered into financing agreements, among other agreements, with Motorola that provided 
that the permits, assets and physical improvements in each market cross-collateralized the loans 
in the other market (in addition to other assets pledged). For example, if Cellcom defaulted on 
its Utah-5 loan, Motorola had the right to foreclose on the Utah-5 permit, property and assets or 
on the PA-11 permit, property and assets, or both. QcL at f 14.) 
66. Due to Syscom's failure to account for the monies that it spent, Motorola declared 
Cellcom in default of the Utah-5 loan, and among other things, foreclosed on both the Utah-5 and 
PA-11 permits, property and assets. QcL at K 15.) 
67. A few months before the foreclosures, Cellcom received a bona fide offer to 
purchase the construction permit, property and assets for PA-11 for $9,000,000 cash. Cellcom 
did not accept the offer. QcL at 16.) Due to Syscom's breach of contract in failing to account, 
Cellcom lost the PA-11 market valued at $9,000,000. (IdJ 
68. An accounting was completed during pendency of the first appeal, which shows 
substantial losses suffered by Cellcom due to Syscom's mismanagement, misappropriation of 
funds, and other contract violations. For instance, the accounting shows: 
a. Syscom paid itself $107,638.54 for a few months work, far in excess of the 
$10,000 per month management fee; 
b. Syscom spent $189,093.26 on equipment, although all telecommunication 
equipment was supplied directly by Motorola; 
c. Syscom spent $7,511.53 of Cellcom's money on office expenses when the 
Management Agreement provided that Syscom would run the office "at its own expense"; 
d. Syscom spent $11,708.54 of Cellcom's money on telephone expenses when 
the contract specifically provided that Syscom would provide the telephone line at "its own 
expense." (J± at 1 18 and Ex. B [accounting].) 
69. The above-recited accounting evidence could not have been produced at trial 
because Cellcom had still not received all receipts, invoices, checks, ledgers and the like from 
Syscom despite repeated discovery requests. It was not until after the trial that Cellcom hired a 
certified public accountant to go through Syscom's incomplete records to determine what was still 
missing, reconstruct missing information from bank accounts, recreate ledgers, and to fully 
account for the hundreds of thousands of dollars spent by Syscom. QcL at \ 20.) 
70. Some of this evidence was not collected by Cellcom's attorneys because they did 
not have sufficient time before trial. Knowing that they were not prepared, and for other reasons, 
attorneys Heaton and Schow of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, moved to withdraw so other counsel 
could more completely investigate and try the case. The court denied the motion four days before 
trial and the case went forward without Cellcom's lawyers being sufficiently prepared. Q$L at 
120.) 
71. Mr. Sorensen did not promote the business. He did not perform any marketing 
functions. He failed to ensure that roaming agreements were reached with other cellular 
companies. (Id.) 
72. There were many problems with the system when Cellcom took it over in March 
1991. Cellcom was not aware of the many problems, as its agent Marie Bagshaw either did not 
know of the problems or did not inform attorneys Heaton, Schow and Eckersley of those 
problems. Some of those problems were as follows: 
a. The Asphalt Ridge cell site tower was installed at the wrong location. 
Cellcom's FAA and FCC filings specified the exact location of the tower. Syscom moved the 
tower to a different location and then informed Cellcom. This required expensive re-engineering 
and additional FAA and FCC filings. 
b. The Blue Bench cell site location was also moved, again by Syscom without 
Cellcom's knowledge, and this time Syscom did not inform Cellcom it had moved the tower. 
Again, expensive re-engineering and additional government filings were required. 
c. At the Asphalt Ridge site no FCC licenses were posted as required by law. 
No fire extinguishers were included. No first-aid kit was included in the building. The air filter 
was the wrong kind. The building was built too small. There were holes in the building, 
allowing numerous insects to infiltrate. There were numerous loose nuts, bolts and screws and 
expensive telecommunication equipment was not secured or fastened properly to the walls, 
ceilings or floors. 
d. The microwave, a critical piece of equipment that was installed from the 
Asphalt Ridge cell site to the Vernal MTSO building, was the wrong piece of equipment as it was 
not redundant. That is, if that microwave went down, the whole system would also be down. 
e. Weather stripping was not installed in the Blue Bench building and 
improperly installed in the Asphalt Ridge and MTSO buildings. The Blue Bench tower was bent, 
probably caused by a guy wire being incorrectly installed. The grounding of the Blue Bench 
equipment racks was not completed. The Blue Bench microwave was also not redundant. 
f. The Vernal MTSO site had extensive cracking of the asphalt installed 
around the circumference of the building causing swelling and water infiltration into the building. 
g. The doors in all three sites leaked water, dirt and insects allowing the 
buildings that were suppose to be air tight to be infested with bugs, cobwebs and scorpions. 
h. The telephone lines from and to the sites were not completed as required. 
None of the coax cables were provided with ice shields as required. 
i. About 30 or 40 safety locking nuts were missing on the towers, causing the 
towers to be very dangerous. No lightning protection was provided on the towers. 
j . Against Cellcom's express orders, Syscom used Cellcom's money to employ 
Cellcom's engineering firm to engineer Syscom's own communications site at Little Mountain and 
caused it to be treated as one of Cellcom's sites as indicated on the Cellular Geographic Service 
Area (CGSA) maps. The CGSA maps at the time continually show Little Mountain as one of 
Cellcom's sites when it was not, and when, in fact, it belonged to Syscom. Mr. O'Neill suspects 
Syscom used Cellcom's money to improve the site by having an expensive power line run up the 
mountain to their site. 
k. System manuals and documentation left behind by Syscom were in a mess. 
The upgrades were not put in the manuals and old manuals were intermingled with new manuals. 
(R. 1365 at f 19 and attachments thereto.) 
73. Syscom did not develop any sales agents as was required in the Management 
Agreement. (Id.) 
74. In February 1992, before John R. Anderson took the bench, he was a partner in 
the two-person firm of Beaslin & Anderson. (Affidavit of Andrew M. Morse, 11 3, 4; R- 1341.) 
75. During that month, Neal Sorensen, President of Syscom, proposed to sell his 
shares back to Syscom. (Affidavit of Rodney Hauer, 11 2-4; R. 1214.) 
76. McKeachnie & Allred, Syscom and Neal Sorensen's lawyers in this action, drafted 
a detailed Stock Purchase Agreement ("Agreement") whereby Syscom would purchase Neal 
Sorensen's stock for $72,000 over four years with interest as reflected in the Agreement attached 
to the Affidavit of Rod Hauer. (Id, at 1 5.) 
77. Mr. Hauer then became president of Syscom. McKeachnie & Allred had a conflict 
of interest in representing Neal Sorensen (the seller) and Syscom (the buyer) in the transaction and 
sent Syscom to Beaslin & Anderson to be represented by that firm. (IdL. at 11 6-7.) 
78. Beaslin & Anderson accepted the employment of Syscom and Rod Hauer. 
Beaslin & Anderson, through Mr. Beaslin, represented Syscom and Rod Hauer in the Agreement 
which was signed in February 1992, but was to be performed over the next four years. (IcL at 
11 7-8.) 
79. Judge John R. Anderson was appointed to the bench in July 1992 and took the 
bench in September 1992. 
80. Counsel for plaintiff discovered Beaslin & Anderson's involvement with Syscom 
when this lawsuit was tentatively settled in late July 1995. (Aff. of Andrew M. Morse K 3; 
R. 1341.) At that time, counsel did not know Judge Anderson had been associated with Attorney 
Beaslin. (Id, at f 4.) 
81. The Agreement referred to the instant litigation and made provisions for the 
division of any judgment awarded to Syscom. (R. 1210.) 
82. During the August 21, 1995 hearing on plaintiffs motion to enforce an oral 
settlement agreement, the Agreement was entered as an exhibit. Judge Anderson read the 
Agreement, that expressly listed his firm as representing the defendant, but said nothing about an 
appearance of impropriety or impartiality. (Affidavit of Andrew M. Morse, \ 5; R. 1341.) 
83. From the court's silence and his duty under U.C.A. § 78-7-1(1) and Canon 3 of 
the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, to disclose prior representation of Syscom, plaintiffs counsel 
concluded that either Beaslin & Anderson had in fact not represented Syscom, or that the court 
had disclosed its representation of Syscom to prior counsel for Cellcom, Messrs. Schow, Heaton 
and Eckersley, of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, and received their consent to continue on the case. 
(Id, at 16.) 
84. On August 22, 1995, Mr. Morse contacted Mr. Eckersley, who reported that he 
knew nothing of Judge Anderson's representation of Syscom and that no disclosure had been 
made. He promised to check with Mr. Schow, but warned Mr. Schow was no longer with the 
firm and plaintiffs counsel could not locate him. (Id, at 7.) 
85. On August 25, 1995, Mr. Morse spoke with Mr. Beaslin who confirmed that 
Beaslin & Anderson had represented Syscom as indicated in the Stock Purchase Agreement. ddL 
at 1 9.) 
86. On October 3, 1995, plaintiffs counsel learned from Mr. Eckersley that Judge 
Anderson had not disclosed to Mr. Schow, or Mr. Heaton that his firm had represented Syscom. 
Mr. Eckersley apologized for the delay in finding Mr. Schow, as his whereabouts after having left 
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler had been unknown. (IdL at \ 9.) 
87. Plaintiff moved to recuse Judge Anderson on October 11, 1995. (R. 1050.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Syscom's counterclaim fails because it arises from Syscom's work as a contractor while 
Syscom was unlicensed. The trial court's holding that Syscom could recover because it was 
Cellcom's agent, and therefore not a contractor, is wrong, because even an agent must be licensed 
if it does contracting work within the meaning of the Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act, 
U.C.A.§ 58-55-101 et seq. (1995). 
Syscom was not entitled to recover because it failed to prove that it had completely 
performed the subject contract: it grossly overspent, failed to account for monies spent, and failed 
to perform other contract duties. The court's refusal to make these findings was clearly 
erroneous. Rather, the court should have found that Syscom's breaches caused Cellcom 
substantial damages. Further, the court abused its discretion by failing to reopen the case or order 
a new trial to consider additional detailed evidence of Syscom's breaches and Cellcom's damages. 
Finally, the court erred by failing to recuse itself. A few months before hearing this case, 
the court's two-person firm represented Syscom on a transaction related to this litigation, raising 
the specter that the court may have had a financial interest in the case, and creating the appearance 
of impartiality sufficient to warrant recusal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE IS NOT SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT 
SYSCOM WAS NOT A CONTRACTOR UNDER THE UTAH 
CONSTRUCTION TRADES LICENSING ACT. 
Syscom's counterclaim against Cellcom must fail unless Syscom was not engaged as a 
contractor under Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-101 et seq. (1995), the Utah Construction Trades 
Licensing Act ("Act"), or unless Syscom qualified for a statutory or common law exception to 
the licensing requirement. American Rural Cellular. 890 P.2d at 1036. Cellcom presented 
evidence at trial that Syscom fell within two statutory definitions of contractor: (1) any person 
who represents himself to be a contractor by advertising or any other means; and (2) a 
construction manager who performs management and counseling services on a construction project 
for a fee. Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-102(b) and (e) (1995). Nonetheless, the trial court determined 
on remand, without addressing either of these statutory definitions, that Syscom was not a 
contractor, but was Cellcom's "agent." 
The court erroneously concluded that because Syscom was Cellcom's agent, it need not 
be licensed under the Act. This conclusion is at odds with the Act, the fundamental premise of 
which is that persons who perform services in the "construction trade" must be licensed: 
Any person engaged in the construction trades licensed under this Chapter, or as 
a contractor regulated under this Chapter, shall become licensed under this Chapter 
before engaging in the trades or contracting activity in this state unless specifically 
exempted from licensure under § 58-55-305. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-301 (1995). "Construction trades" are defined as: 
Any trade or occupation involving construction, alteration, remodeling, repairing, 
wrecking or demolition, addition to or improvements of any building, highway, 
road, railroad, dam, bridge, structure, excavation or other project, development 
or improvement to other than personal property. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-102(6) (1995). The exceptions to the licensing requirement, contained 
in U.C.A. § 58-55-305 (1995), make no exception for "agents." Finally, the very bar to recovery 
at issue here expressly prohibits contractors from being "agents": 
No contractor may act as an agent or commence or maintain any action in any 
court of the state for collection of compensation for performing any act for which 
a license is required by this Chapter without alleging and proving that he was a 
properly licensed contractor . . . . 
U.C.A. § 58-55-604 (1995) (emphasis added). Thus, because Syscom was performing a 
construction trade due to its "construction . . . [of a] building [and] road [to the sites]" under 
U.C.A. § 58-55-102(6) (1995), it was required to be licensed. U.C.A. § 58-55-301 (1995). 
This conclusion is consistent with case law where courts look not to the labels attached to 
relationships between owners and contractors, but instead to the actual work performed to 
determine whether a license is required. For example, in Reidy v. Blackwell. 681 P.2d 916 
(Ariz. App. 1983), the purported "agent" brought an action against an owner to recover wages 
and a fixed fee owed under a contract to build a house. The "agent" was not a licensed 
contractor. The court upheld summary judgment for the owner relying on A.R.S. § 32-1153, an 
identical statutory bar to U.C.A. § 58-55-604 (1995). The court examined the obligations, 
responsibilities and work performed by the "agent," and concluded that "there can be no doubt 
that Reidy was acting under this agreement as a contractor within the meaning A.R.S. § 32-1101," 
and that Reidy was barred from suing because he was not licensed. See also. Columbia Group 
Inc. v. Home Owner's Association. 727 P.2d 352 (Ariz. App. 1986). 
The court's designation of Sy scorn as an "agent" is, therefore, irrelevant under the Act. 
If it was a contractor under the Act, it needed to be licensed in order to bring its counterclaim. 
Even if relevant, the question of whether Syscom acted as Cellcom's agent or as an 
independent contractor1 is only relevant to the construction phase of the project, since Syscom 
could only file mechanics' liens for monies claimed from the construction phase of the project, 
and not to recover the intangible service fees it claims Cellcom owed it once the system was built. 
Thus, any indication that Syscom seemed like an agent once the system was built is irrelevant to 
Syscom's status as a contractor under the Act.2 
A. Syscom Would Have To Be Under Cellcom's Daily Control During the 
Construction Phase of the Project in Order To Be Its Agent. 
An agency relationship may result when one is subject to control as to the means employed 
to accomplish a result or perform a job, while an independent contractor relationship arises when 
one is not under such control. Thiokol Chemical Corporation v. Peterson. 15 Utah 2d 355, 393 
P.2d 391, 359 n.6 (Utah 1964). In Glover v. Bov Scouts of America. 299 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 
(Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court discussed the amount of control necessary to establish an 
1One may be an independent contractor for some purposes and an agent for other purposes. See Gordon v. 
CRS Consulting Engineers. Inc.. 820 P.2d 492 (Utah App. 1991) (status as independent contractor and agent are not 
always mutually exclusive). Thus, even if this Court determined that Syscom acted as Cellcom's agent for some 
purposes, this should not detract from the relevant inquiry: whether Syscom was a contractor as defined under Utah 
statute. 
2This Court observed that Syscom could also file mechanics' liens if it fell within a statutory exemption to 
licensing. The trial court based its award to Syscom for improvements covered under the liens solely on its 
determination that Syscom was not a contractor, not that it fell within one of the statutory or common law exemptions 
to the Act. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 11). 
agency relationship and concluded that a scoutmaster was not an agent of Boy Scouts of America 
("BSA"). The plaintiff contended that BSA exerted sufficient control over scoutmasters to deem 
them agents, because BSA prohibited scoutmasters from taking major departures from BSA 
policies or from undertaking certain dangerous activities, required them to wear specific uniforms, 
required them to seek permission before their troops raised funds, and provided scoutmaster 
training and suggestions for troop activities. Nonetheless, the court viewed this evidence as 
insufficient as a matter of law to establish an agency relationship. Glover. 299 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 13-14. BSA was not the principal of the scoutmaster because it did not "retain the right to 
control day-to-day troop operations." Id at 12. See also Foster v. Steed. 432 P.2d 60, 63 (Utah 
1967) (Texaco franchisee was not agent even though Texaco instructed it on marketing and 
operations because Texaco did not retain day-to-day control, but "merely influenced the result to 
be achieved.") 
There must be substantial competent evidence that Cellcom controlled Syscom's daily 
activities during the construction phase of the project before Syscom can properly be called 
Celleom's agent. Without such evidence, Syscom was an independent contractor required to be 
licensed. 
B. Even Marshaling All Conceivable Evidence That Syscom Was Celleom's 
Agent. This Evidence Does Not Sufficiently Show That Syscom Was an 
Agent During the Construction Phase of the Project. 
The trial court based its determination that Syscom was Celleom's agent on the following 
factors: Syscom arranged the financing for the project by introducing Cellcom to Motorola, 
which provided financing for the construction phase (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
["F's and C's"] 1 1); Syscom completed the interface with US West Communications (Id.): 
Syscom did the electrical and telephonic systems engineering to get the system up and running 
(Id.): Syscom did whatever was necessary with Cellcom's blessing (Id.): as construction 
progressed, the parties communicated about the progressions "nearly daily," and Cellcom directed 
Syscom to withdraw money and send it to Cellcom in Florida (F's and C's, K 7). 
The only other "evidence" suggesting that Syscom was an agent appears in the 
Management Agreement, which states that Syscom was to construct the system "subject to 
Cellcom's exclusive right of unfettered control over business assets, facilities, operations, and 
policy decisions." Significantly, no unfettered control is reserved over construction activities. 
Instead, the Management Agreement provided that Syscom would supervise construction of the 
system, but keep Cellcom apprised of the status of such activities at all times. Finally, the 
Management Agreement declared that any contract Syscom recommend be executed for the 
construction of the system be approved by Cellcom. 
The above "evidence" does not constitute substantial competent evidence of an agency 
relationship. Glover, supra. The evidence that Mr. Sorensen introduced Cellcom to Motorola 
and arranged financing is not competent. Cellcom had had a relationship with Motorola since 
1985 and was not introduced to Motorola by Mr. Sorensen. Cellcom had been negotiating with 
several vendors, including Motorola, prior to Syscom's involvement with Cellcom. Significantly, 
no one from Cellcom or Motorola confirmed Mr. Sorensen's assertion. Even if competent 
evidence existed that Syscom arranged for financing, the trial court failed to explain how this fact 
made Syscom an agent. 
Similarly, the other evidence relied on by the trial court to support its conclusion that 
Syscom was an agent merely indicates that Syscom was performing certain activities on behalf of 
Cellcom with the goal of constructing the system. Syscom could have completed the interface and 
the "electronic and telephonic systems engineering"3 in the capacity of an agent, independent 
contractor, partner, or something else. The facts that it communicated "almost daily" with 
Cellcom and apprised it of activities does not mean that Cellcom dictated the activities and the 
method of performing them. The crucial evidence, that Syscom performed the above at the 
direction and under the control of Cellcom, is missing. In fact, the trial court's statement that 
Syscom did "whatever was necessary with Plaintiffs blessing," suggests that Syscom was an 
independent contractor who enjoyed a great degree of freedom in determining what was necessary 
to construct the system and then doing it, with a rubber stamp approval from Cellcom. 
There is also a smattering of evidence in Finding No. 7 that might support the court's 
finding that Syscom was an agent of Cellcom. The court therein found "the parties' actions 
indicate their recognition that A.R.C. was in total control, and could direct, and at times did 
direct, how work was to be performed and how money was spent." Yet the court's cites to pages 
R. 653 and 654 do not support the finding in any respect. The testimony on those pages simply 
indicates that a certain amount of money was available to construct and manage the system for a 
year and that at times Cellcom directed that certain money should be transferred to it in Florida 
or to its attorneys in Washington D.C. That the Management Agreement indicated that Cellcom 
retained the unfettered discretion to control its assets and facilities, does not mean that Syscom 
was an agent for these purposes. "Retaining a right to supervise or inspect, without more, does 
not establish control. (Citations omitted.) Rather, the evidence must tend to establish control or 
3There is no cite to the record for this finding. The evidence is that an East Coast engineering firm did radio 
frequency studies to determine where the sites should be located. In addition, Mr. Sorensen was not, nor was anybody 
else at Syscom, educated or licensed as an engineer. 
the right to control the manner of performance." (Citations omitted.) United Employer's 
Insurance Co. v. Mentor. 1996 W.L. 509559 (Wash. App. Div. 1 (September 1996)). 
Here, although Cellcom had a right to control how its money was spent, it did not exercise 
control over how construction monies were spent. Rather, it let Syscom decide how the money 
should be spent to best build the system, which Syscom said it could build, promised to build, was 
capable of building and did, to some extent, build. The evidence is undisputed that no one from 
Cellcom controlled any aspect of Syscom's construction operation. No one from Cellcom visited 
Utah during the construction phase of the operation. Marie Bagshaw visited Utah only after 
construction was substantially completed in January 1991. The court found that "plaintiff and its 
engineers supervised Syscom." (F's and C's, 116.) The court cites no evidence for this Finding, 
aside from the Management Agreement without reference to page or paragraph number. 
Engineers from the East Coast plotted where the sites should be located, and then had no more 
association with the project. There is no evidence that any engineer hired by Cellcom, or anybody 
from Cellcom, supervised Syscom while Syscom built the system. 
In review, although the Management Agreement contains language stating Syscom would 
operate the system subject to Cellcom's right to control assets, facilities, operations and policy 
decisions, the Management Agreement itself expressly states that Syscom was an independent 
contractor. (Ex. 1, pp. 1-2.) This Court noted that the parties expressly disavowed any agency 
relationship between them. American Rural Cellular. 890 P.2d at 1038. The evidence supporting 
a conclusion that Syscom was a contractor, on the other hand, is much more substantial. 
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C. Substantial Competent Evidence Exists That Syscom Was a Contractor. 
There is "ample" evidence that Syscom fit the statutory definition of a contractor by 
"represent[ing] [itself] to be a contractor by advertising or any other means." U.C.A. § 58-55-
102(7)(b) (1995), American Rural Cellular. 890 P.2d at 1038. This Court noted that Marie 
Bagshaw testified that Syscom represented to Cellcom that it itself could construct, or contract for 
the construction of, the buildings needed for the cellular telephone system. Ms. Bagshaw stated 
that Syscom showed Cellcom buildings and towers it had previously erected for other jobs, and 
that Syscom's president stated Syscom was qualified to "help build the system and to help 
construct the buildings and whatever needed to be done." Syscom's president further admitted 
that he made these representations for the purpose of convincing Cellcom to use Syscom to 
perform the construction phase of the project. Syscom listed itself as the general and electrical 
contractor on Cellcom's building permit applications. Finally, the Management Agreement 
expressly declares that Syscom is Cellcom's independent contractor and not its agent. American 
Rural Cellular. 890 P.2d at 1037-1038.4 
Not only does this Court have substantial evidence to conclude Syscom was a contractor 
because it represented itself as a contractor under § 58-55-l02(7)(b), there is "ample support" that 
4
 Although the trial court did not address on remand whether Syscom represented itself to be a contractor 
through advertising or other means, this Court observed that Syscom's president testified at trial that Syscom was "a 
telephone and radio company, as well as we did a lot of other forms of technical wireless communications." 
American Rural Cellular. 890 P.2d at 1039. There is no evidence that Syscom represented that it was a telephone 
and radio company and not a contractor at the relevant times, i.e. when Cellcom was searching for a builder for the 
system and while Syscom was building the system. The Management Agreement makes no mention of Syscom being 
a telephone company. 
a i 
Syscom was a contractor because it acted as a construction manager performing management and 
counseling services on a construction project for a fee under § 58-55-102(7)(e).5 
Furthermore, Syscom's president undertook on-site management of the construction and 
was the responsible person from Syscom to see that the cellular system was constructed. The 
contract specifically required Syscom to construct the buildings and towers. (Ex. 1, pp. 3-4.) 
Syscom provided a detailed bid to get the job, just like any contractor. It alone hired and paid 
subcontractors to perform various tasks. It had to account for construction monies spent. 
Significantly, it saw itself as a contractor when it employed the contractor's lever- the mechanic's 
lien. Finally, the trial court found that the $10,000 per month service fee was a fee for 
"management services" presumably rendered during construction. (F's and C's, \ 6.) 
Syscom qualified as a construction contractor under U.C.A. § 58-55-102(7)(b) and (e) 
(1995). It was required under the Act to be licensed. U.C.A. § 58-55-301 (1995). Because it 
was never licensed, the trial court erred in determining that it could recover under its action to 
foreclose the mechanics' liens. U.C.A. § 58-55-604 (1995).6 
5Marie Bagshaw testified that the $10,000 service fee provided for Syscom's compensation in the 
Management Agreement came out of the construction account, with respect to which "you could only do a draw down 
after you had completed a phase of the construction." She testified that "that was always the understanding that we 
had with the Management Agreement. . . was that the $10,000 per month was a construction fee for Syscom for the 
use of their people to help construct the system." Ms. Bagshaw also testified that Syscom paid all of its subcontractors 
and suppliers directly, that none of those invoices ever came through Cellcom's office, and that Mr. Sorensen never 
asked for authorization to make any construction-related expenditure or to pay anyone. American Rural Cellular. 890 
P.2d at 1038-1039. 
6Despite this Court's directive in Cellcom I. the trial court did not apply the evidence to the Act, and did not 
therefore address whether any of the statutory or common law exceptions apply, apparently conceding that none do. 
Cellcom, therefore, will not address this issue. 
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D. No Other Significant Findings Are Supported by the Evidence. 
Two other signficant Findings are not supported by substantial confident evidence. They 
are that Cellcom breached the contract by failing to communicate with Syscom (F's and C's, 
t 11); and that the construction completed by Syscom was reasonably priced, completed in a 
workmanlike manner, and that Cellcom was satisfied with the system. (F's and C's, f f 14, 16.) 
The court found that Cellcom breached the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing by 
ceasing to communicate with Syscom, and that its failure to communicate "commenced several 
months prior to the termination of the agreement [March 20, 1991]," citing to R. 571. On that 
page, Ms. Bagshaw identified the February 1991 letter from her to Mr. Sorensen wherein she 
requested substantial documents and financial records from Syscom; she also identified Mr. 
Sorensen's return letter dated February 11. She admits that communications at this point were 
not as regular as they had been. "Neal and I had phone calls, but not on a regular basis. They 
were sparse at this point." (R. 571.) That is all the evidence that the court cites. In arguable 
support of this finding, Mr. Sorensen testified that he had "no communication" with Cellcom 
beginning at the end of January. He quickly retracted and admitted that Ms. Bagshaw "did talk 
to me one or two times during that period of time." (R. 819-820.) That is the extent of the 
evidence in support Finding No. 11. 
There is overwhelming evidence to dispute the finding. Ms. Bagshaw denied that she 
failed to communicate with Mr. Sorensen between late January and March 20. She had several 
phone calls with him. Specifically on March 1 she called him and talked "at length about the 
problems with the system." (R. 605-606.) They also discussed how many customers were online, 
and whether to hire a direct sales person. She explained to him that "We have a problem. We 
are unhappy with what is going on." QsL) In addition, Ms. Bagshaw visited Syscorn in Vernal, 
Utah traveling there from Florida by the end of January 1991. She met with Mr. Sorensen, 
explained the problems, requested documents and was told by him that the documents had already 
been sent to her office in Florida. After she returned to Florida, and still no documents had 
arrived in the mail, she again communicated with Mr. Sorensen by sending him a registered letter 
on February 7, 1991, again detailing the various problems with the system and requesting specific 
documents. On February 11, Mr. Sorensen sent a reply letter, again promising to deliver 
documents. None of those documents were ever delivered. The court's finding, therefore, is 
clearly erroneous because it is "against the clear weight of the evidence." Cal. Wads worth 
Constr. v. City of St. George. 898 P.2d 1372, 1378 (Utah 1995), quoting State v. Walker. 743 
P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
The court's finding that the system was completed at a reasonable price and that Cellcom 
was well satisfied, is against the clear weight of the evidence. (F's and C's, t1f 14, 16.) Evidence 
in favor of this finding is Ms. Bagshaw's testimony; she testified that the construction costs listed 
on Syscom's exhibits were pretty close to the bids; but they did not include the tens of thousands 
of dollars in man hours and tech hours that Sy scorn claimed. She also testified that the con-
struction was completed, that it was done in a workmanlike manner and it was done quickly. 
(R. 626.) She also admits that the invoices prepared by Sy scorn reflect work that was actually 
performed and items actually purchased, with the exception of the tech hours discussed above. 
(R. 663.) This is the extent of the evidence in support of the finding. 
This is not substantial competent evidence because there is no evidence that items Syscom 
purchased or work it performed were reasonably necessary, or that the prices charged were 
-34-
reasonable. There is also no evidence that the tens of thousands of dollars worth of equipment 
was actually installed, a relevant inquiry in light of Motorola's supply and installation of much, 
if not all, of the electronic equipment, leaving little or nothing for Syscom to buy or install. 
The system was not completed in a workmanlike manner. Ms. Bagshaw testified that 
initially she thought the system was completed satisfactorily, but later found out that much of the 
electrical wiring at all the sites were done very poorly, in violation of the National Electric Code, 
and that much of the wiring had to be redone. Other problems were later discovered: the cell 
sites had been built on the wrong spots requiring additional engineering and surveying work and 
additional filings with the FCC and Federal Aeronotics Administration [FAA]; buildings were not 
airtight as required; towers were bent; equipment was not bolted to the floor, ceilings and walls 
as required. In sum, the buildings were not constructed in a workmanlike manner. 
The most important erroneous finding was that products and services rendered by Syscom 
were done at a reasonable price. Had it been done at a reasonable price, this lawsuit would never 
have risen. As Cellcom has adequately proven, Syscom spent way too much money, far beyond 
the budget amounts to complete the tasks assigned. The finding is clearly erroneous. 
POINT II 
SYSCOM FAILED TO SATISFY CONTRACTUAL CONDI-
TIONS PRECEDENT, EXCUSING CELLCOM'S OBLIGATION 
TO PERFORM. 
Syscom breached material conditions precedent, excusing Cellcom from its duty to pay or 
reimburse Syscom. Conversely, because of Syscom's undisputed breaches, it failed to prove that 
it fully and completely performed the contract, thus it is not entitled to contract payment. Rather, 
Cellcom is entitled to judgment against Syscom for breach of contract. 
The facts, as stated above, detail Syscom's breaches and the damages suffered by Cellcom. 
Essentially, Syscom had $376,518.93 at its disposal, which was more than enough to build the 
system and then operate it from October 1990 through September 1991. In November 1990 
Syscom had spent all the money, and could not account for it. In November 1990 only 
$240,018.93 should have spent; there should have been $136,500.00 left in the account. In 
addition, Syscom claims it is entitled to an additional $86,374.40. Therefore, Syscom admits it 
spent $462,893.33 ($376,518.93 plus $86,374.40), when it should have only spent far less than 
$300,000.00. Syscom's claims are factually and legally groundless. 
Syscom's full and complete performance of the contract was a condition precedent to 
Cellcom's duty to pay Syscom. "Failure of a material condition precedent relieves the other party 
of any obligation to perform." Kinsman v. Kinsman. 748 P.2d 210 (Utah App. 1988). Here 
Syscom failed to perform several material conditions precedent, thereby excusing Cellcom's 
obligation to pay any further monies to Syscom. 
The contract required Syscom to construct the cell sites, operate the system, follow good 
business practice, and to accurately account for every dollar spent.7 
Syscom was responsible for the "[development, implementation and maintenance of 
financial controls and procedures, including relationships with financial institutions, to insure 
7Cellcom wishes to engage Syscom . . . as an independent contractor to manage the construction, operation, 
periodic redesign and maintenance of the cellular telecommunications system and business for the permit area. (Ex. 
1,75, pp. 1-2). 
Syscom shall perform all services under this Management Agreement under a fiduciary relationship with 
Cellcom in accordance with the reasonable standards of honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and in a professional 
manner that will best serve the financial and business interests of Cellcom in the permit area. Svscom's performance 
under this Management Agreement shall comply in all material respects with good business practices in the industry. 
(Id- at p. 3) (emphasis added) 
ic 
efficient collection and deposit, investment and disbursement of funds in the name and on behalf 
of Cellcom." (Management Agreement Ex. 1, at p. 4) (emphasis added). 
Syscom was also responsible for the "[development and maintenance of financial record 
keeping procedures and maintenance of records of all transactions relating to the construction and 
operation of the system ." (Id.) (emphasis added). The contract provided: 
Syscom shall provide Cellcom with access, upon reasonable notice and reasonable 
times, to the books and records maintained by Syscom with respect to the system. 
Syscom recognizes Cellcom's need to have the right to conduct full and complete 
audits without limitation, all at Cellcom's expense." (Id, at p. 9) 
Syscom was required to fully and completely perform all aspects of the contract before it 
was entitled to compensation: "As compensation for full and proper compliance with the terms 
of this Management Agreement, Syscom shall be entitled to [listed compensation]." (Id. p. 12) 
(emphasis added). Syscom breached each of the above quoted material conditions precedent. It 
did not fully and completely perform the contract and was not entitled to compensation. 
Syscom failed to " develop[] and maintain[] financial record keeping procedures and 
maintain!] records of all transactions relating to the construction and operation of the system." 
Cellcom repeatedly asked Syscom for all financial records so that Cellcom could do the accounting 
that Syscom was supposed to do. Marie Bagshaw wrote letters, made phone calls and even 
personally visited Syscom's offices in Vernal, all in a futile effort to obtain the financial records. 
Cellcom needed the financial records in order to account to its lender, Motorola, which required 
quarterly accountings in October 1990 and in January 1991. Cellcom's attempts in November 
1990 and February 1991 to account to Motorola with the sketchy information supplied by Syscom 
were rejected by Motorola. Moreover, Mr. Sorensen knew that his submissions were 
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unsatisfactory to Motorola, and that further financing was jeopardized by his failure to account. 
He also understood that the contract required him to account for the money. 
Syscom breached material conditions precedent, and cost Cellcom dearly. Not only did 
it lose $136,000 that should have still been in the bank when Syscom informed Cellcom that it had 
run out of money, but Motorola refused additional financing, declaring Cellcom in default for 
failure to account for the loaned funds. The loans given by Motorola to Cellcom to improve the 
Utah and Pennsylvania permit areas were cross-collateralized, meaning that the Utah-5 and PA-11 
permits, assets and improvements secured the Utah note. When Cellcom defaulted on the Utah-5 
note due to Syscom's breach, Motorola foreclosed the PA-11 and Utah-5 projects, causing 
Cellcom to lose the PA-11 permit valued at approximately $9,000,000. 
Syscom was also obliged to act as Cellcom's fiduciary, complying with reasonable 
standards of honesty, integrity and fair dealing. (Ex. 1 & 75, p. 2). By failing and refusing to 
account, overspending, and filing mechanic's liens, Syscom intentionally and with bad faith 
breached material provisions of the contract. 
Finally, Syscom's paying itself for "tech hours" was a material breach of another condition 
precedent. The contract specified Syscom's compensation: 
For the benefits conferred and the compensation to be paid to Syscom hereinafter 
stated, Syscom shall, at its own expense, unless otherwise specifically stated, and 
subject always to Cellcom's right of continuing control and approval, diligently 
perform the following services for Cellcom: (Ex. 1, ^3.) 
The plain meaning of this provision is that "unless otherwise specifically stated," Syscom 
was to perform all listed duties including, construction and financial duties, for the compensation 
specified, $10,000 a month for 60 months, a total of $600,000, plus other remunerations. 
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Nowhere in the contract does it "specifically state[|" or even so much as imply that Syscom would 
be paid separately for the services of Mr. Sorensen or his employees. 
Although Mr. Sorensen testified that he did not charge for his time, his own invoices 
demonstrate that he charged and collected $18,247.29 for his time alone. (See Ex. 10, invoice 
#14545; Ex. 11, invoice 14548; Ex. 12, invoice 14549, including $1,249.79 in "tax.") These 
exhibits list only "Neal" under "Tech signature," and make no mention of anyone else working 
the hours charged. Syscom breached a material condition precedent when it paid itself for 
Mr. Sorensen's time, while at the same time it collected the $10,000 a month contract payment. 
In addition, it never informed Cellcom that it was making these additional payments to itself. 
Only after Cellcom took over the system and Syscom presented invoices for tech hours did it learn 
of this breach. 
Syscom's charges for its employees' time was also a material breach. In addition to the 
above quoted clauses, the contract provides: 
COMPENSATION 
a. As compensation for full and proper compliance with the terms of this 
Management Agreement. Syscom shall be entitled to the following: 
(1) A Service Fee to be paid via monthly payments of $10,000 payable on 
the 15th day of each month during the term of this Management Agreement. (Ex. 
1,1 6, pp. 12-13) 
This provision means that Syscom would be paid $10,000 a month for 60 months for "foil 
and proper compliance" with the contract. It did not permit Syscom to be paid $10,000 a month 
for partial compliance, and then charge by the hour for the same work. Paragraph 4 of the 
Management Agreement, quoted above, means that "at a minimum" the resources that Syscom 
would devote included all the efforts of Mr. Sorensen and Mr. Hauer, plus, by necessary 
implication, any employee's time required to complete the contractual duties. (Ex. 1, f 4, p. 9). 
As if that were not enough, the first quoted clause provides that for the $10,000 a month. 
"Syscom shall, at its own expense, unless otherwise specifically stated, and subject always to 
Cellcom's right of continuing control and approval, diligently perform the following services for 
Cellcom[.]" (Ex. 1, f 3). Simply put, Syscom was to perform the contract "at its own expense" 
in exchange for $10,000 a month. Syscom did not perform the work at its own expense; rather, 
it charged Cellcom for thousands of dollars' worth of its employees' time, in direct breach of the 
contract. 
In addition to the $18,247.29 that Mr. Sorensen collected for his own time, he also 
collected $15,979.50 for his employees' time. (Ex. 43, invoice 15444; including $904.50 in 
"tax"). In all, Syscom took from Cellcom's accounts $34,226.79 under the guise of "tech hours" 
in direct breach of the contract. This is a material, if not egregious, breach of the condition 
precedent to pay itself only $10,000 a month to perform the contract. 
Each of the discussed breaches of a material condition precedent excused Cellcom's 
obligation to pay Syscom the amounts it claims are owing. Kinsman v. Kinsman. 748 P.2d 210 
(Utah App. 1988). In Kinsman, the parties to a divorce settled on terms whereby defendant would 
assume and pay certain debts for plaintiffs benefit; in return plaintiff waived alimony "now and 
forever." Defendant did not pay the bills, but filed for bankruptcy. Plaintiff moved to modify 
the divorce decree, seeking alimony. The trial court granted the motion. The appeals court 
affirmed, noting failure of a material condition precedent relieves the other party of any obligation 
to perform. 
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This same rule naturally applies to construction contracts. In Laurel Race Course. Inc. 
v. Regal Construction Co. Inc.. 333 A.2d 142 (Md. 1975), a contractor sued a race track owner 
for amounts allegedly due under a building contract. The contract required an engineer to certify 
that the work was complete and satisfactory. No certificate was obtained. Holding that the certi-
ficate requirement was a condition precedent, the court wrote: 
It is fundamental that where a contractual duty is subject to a condition precedent, 
whether express or implied, there is no duty of performance and there can be no 
breach by nonperformance until the condition precedent is either performed or 
excused. [Citations omitted] 
Id, at 327. See also. Campbell Bldg. Co. v. State Road Commission. 79 P.2d 857 (Utah 1937) 
(duty to pay final payment excused by builder's failure to show all debts for construction had been 
paid); Winn v. Aleda Construction Co. Inc.. 315 S.E.2d 193 (Va.1984) (builder's failure to 
strictly perform excused owner's duty to pay). 
As in the cited cases, Syscorn's failure to account and its breach of other duties excuse 
Cellcom's duty to pay the amounts claimed. Stated another way, Sy scorn's breaches demonstrate 
that it has failed to satisfy its burden to show it fully and completely performed the contract, and 
that it was therefore entitled to compensation under the contract. All breaches were material. A 
fundamental duty of Syscom was to accurately and regularly account for the monies entrusted to 
it. This was necessary to insure that the system was constructed within budget, that the system 
was operated efficiently, and most importantly, to satisfy Motorola that its lent funds were 
carefully managed within budget. 
The importance of each condition precedent is demonstrated by the ramifications of its 
breach. Due to Syscom's failure and refusal to account Cellcom could not account to Motorola, 
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causing Motorola to declare Ceilcom in default. In turn, Motorola foreclosed on the Utah-5 and 
PA-11 systems, causing millions of dollars of loss to Ceilcom. Syscom also breached its duty to 
carefully manage the funds, spending $136,500 more than it should have by November 1990, 
when it ran out of money. Even if Syscom had accounted for this money, it could not have 
justified overspending by $136,500, and Motorola would have likely defaulted Ceilcom, anyway. 
Likewise Syscom's taking $34,226.79 for "tech hours" was a material breach, as Ceilcom could 
not have justified this expense to Motorola, again contributing to default. 
There is overwhelming evidence that Syscom breached several material conditions 
precedent. Syscom's brazen mechanic's liens on Cellcom's property and groundless counterclaim 
for additional funds add fuel to the fire. Syscom squandered, lost control of, and otherwise 
fumbled away $376,581.93 of Cellcom's funds that were supposed to last a year but only lasted 
a few months. Having caused Ceilcom to default on its obligations to Motorola and lose the PA-
11 permit greatly damaged Cellcom's Utah-5 business, Syscom now wants another $116,000 for 
its misdeeds. "Such a result will not be tolerated." Kinsman, supra. 
POINT III 
SYSCOM IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER NOTHING. 
Syscom should take nothing. As explained, Syscom breached several material conditions 
precedent, which excuses Ceilcom from its duty to pay and reimburse Syscom. Alternatively, 
Syscom failed to prove that it fully, completely, diligently, and honestly fulfilled all its contractual 
duties, which it was required to demonstrate to prove that it was entitled to compensation. 
Even if Syscom was entitled to compensation and reimbursement, its claim is, for the most 
part, barred because it was an unlicensed contractor. It claims that it is owed a total of 
$86,374.40 (Ex.77). Of this, $77,415.33 is claimed for construction work, improvements and 
materials installed into the system. (Ex. 76 [summary], Ex. 49, 50, 51 [liens]). As an unlicensed 
contractor its lien claims are barred, leaving only $8,958.66 of unbarred claims. Of this, 
$8,872.13 is for claimed "subscriber commissions." (Ex. 30, invoice 15433, Ex. 31, invoice 
14437). Syscorn provided absolutely no proof that it had actually earned any commissions. No 
customer names were provided, no dates of sale were provided. We have only Syscom's 
unsupported invoices created after the system was taken over in March 1991. 
Not only is Sy scorn not entitled to recover any additional funds, its breach of contract 
damaged Cellcom as follows: Unjustified billings made without Cellcom's knowledge or consent 
and not provided for in the contract include a $500.00 charge for office, $32,072.50 charge for 
tech hours, $2,054.29 charge for tax, $2,430.06 for legal, $7,043.60 for on account and 
$14,813.92 for charges for which there is no proof that it was for anything provided in the 
contract, for a total of $58,987.37. This amount is only for money that Syscom paid itself that 
was not provided for in the contract. In addition, Syscom owes Cellcom $136,000 for 
unaccounted-for funds. This is the amount that Syscom should have had in the bank on the day 
it ran out of money in November 1990. 
The mechanic's liens were improper because Syscom did not have a contractor's license. 
It was obviously not entitled to collect for any charges as a contractor and therefore it could not 
have had a legitimate, lawful mechanic's lien. It, therefore, owes Cellcom the attorneys' fees it 
has expended to contest the liens, and substantial damages. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING SYSCOM 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS INCURRED ON APPEAL. 
The trial court awarded Syscom attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal in the amount 
of $22,744.76, attempting to justify its award with the barren statement that Syscom was the 
"most prevailing party" on appeal. (F's and C's, f 26). The court's award is flawed in two 
respects. 
First, Syscom was not the "prevailing party" on appeal. This Court reversed the trial 
court's judgment in Syscom's favor in Cellcom I and remanded the case to the trial court "on the 
issue of whether Syscom can recover" from Cellcom. American Rural Cellular. 890 P.2d at 
1042. The trial court erred in determining that this Court's reversal of its judgment in Syscom's 
favor somehow meant that Syscom was victorious on appeal. It is impossible to tell exactly why 
the trial court felt that Syscom had "prevailed" on appeal because there are no subsidiary facts 
supporting the trial court's determination that Syscom was the "most prevailing party." 
Second, there is no indication in the record that the amount of attorney fees and costs 
entered was reasonable. While Syscom's counsel submitted an affidavit stating only that he had 
incurred $22,744.76 in attorney fees and costs, the affidvait utterly failed to comply with Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-505, which requires "legal basis for the award, the nature 
of the work performed by the attorney, the number of hours spent to prosecute the claim to 
judgment, . . . and affirm the reasonableness of the fees for comparable legal services." The trial 
court's perfunctory rubber-stamping of the exact amount requested by Syscom, without requiring 
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i .onipii.wr wiih Rule A SOS, constituted error. The award of attorney fees and costs incurred on 
appeal and thereafter should be reversed. 
POIMI V 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
CELLCOM'S RULE 59 REQUEST THAT IT RECEIVE NEWLY 
DISCOVERED EVIDENCE OR ORDFR A NFW TTRIAI. 
M'lt'i lln < mill ii ill il Mic 111,11 i mill j |inl
 :u icmanded for new findings, 
Cellcom moved ft-: :; iv. .-. • ..u . t-> rco|x.;i u considering icwh discoxered evidence pursuant 
toRuk ;.,. ;:jw K . . . - . . . . . . . . 
- 59 motion because the evidence was newly discovered, material evidence that should ha\c 
a <nued the outcome of the case, had it been received. •..•••••/.•,.,• 
uniy allci llit" liu'l nitlcil ,nnl I Hit -nil initialed appeal i, 
nuiiuivxk oi thousands of dollars that Syscom expended Prior to iliis h c^u;d n* * fully account 
because Syscom,. failed and refused to turn ovei .\u ;-.wn\ statements aiiu v.iner records requested 
i|m 11111 i|i" ci n"'" > l|k fin MH ii i ml i| n in* ii f'i i|i i mi 11 ii mil to postpone in order to do an accounting) 
oni obtained bank statements, vendor accounts and other financial information necessary to 
j an accounting. Ilr
 linjniiiliiij» sltinui! linl S\SUHII |MM! ilseli "MO/ MS II foi a lew iiiunLli^  
w oi k, even though the Management Agreement limited its monthl) draw to $10,000.00 per month 
as a management fee, It further showed that System, spent $189,093.26 of Cellcom's money on 
a i ' the telecommi mication equipment. 
Finally, it revealed that Syscom spent over $7,000.00 of Cellcom,."s money on, office expenses and 
nearly $12,000 of Cellcom,"s money on, telephone expenses, even though Syiscoin apeed in ihr 
Management A^reen- • > . ffice and use the telephone line "at its own expense." 
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Cellcom learned in late 1993, after appeal commenced, that employee Marie Bagshaw had 
purposefully withheld information from Cellcom officers about problems with the system until 
after trial. These problems included Syscorn's installation of a tower at the Asphalt Ridge and 
Blue Bench sites in the wrong location, incomplete grounding of equipment racks at the Blue 
Bench site, and asphalt swelling around the building Syscom installed at the MTSO site. Nuts, 
bolts, and screws were loose at every site, and the doors to the buildings at all three sites were 
improperly installed. 
The above evidence was essential to Cellcom's claim that Syscom did not perform, but 
instead breached the contract. Had the trial court considered on remand the abundant evidence 
of Syscom's deception and ineptitude, it would have had more than sufficient evidence from which 
to conclude that Syscom materially breached the contract and was liable to Cellcom for the 
resulting damages. Cellcom met all the requisites for the reopening of a trial based on newly 
discovered evidence. Doty v. Town of Cedar Hills. 656 P.2d 993 (Utah 1982) (newly discovered 
evidence must be material and of sufficient substance to create a reasonable likelihood that the 
consideration of the evidence would have yielded a different result). Nonetheless, the trial court 
summarily dismissed Cellcom's Rule 59 motion, despite Cellcom's representation that reopening 
the trial to consider this new evidence would require minimal time to present. See Gardner v. 
Christensen. 622 P.2d 782, 784 (Utah 1980) (motion to reopen trial should have been granted 
where presentation of proposed evidence would not have expended much time). The trial court's 
refusal to hear all relevant evidence deprived Cellcom of a fair trial and constituted an abuse of 
discretion. 
POINi vi 
JUDGE ANDERSON SHOULD HAVE RECUSED HIMSELF. 
A few months ^ n • : 
and its current president, Rodney Hauer , in a transaction closely related i<- this c a s e / Cellcom 
moved to recu.se Judge Anderson on,, two grounds: (a) Utah Code Am. . «uJ (b) 
Ige \ ndei sc n 11t fi1 • r \; • himself. 
j ^ j " - An;j(»rMn\\ failure w recuse himself contravenes Utah Code Ann,. § 78-7- l ( l ) ( a ) , 
- t , : c h 7 r o \ u k > dial .1 ; . . J ^ may not ,. ., _.,_ ... \. . ._h lie is inter ested " . 
^ .le>- ' -1 - 1 ' Uie merits oi tins very Ktip;Uion, and because Judge AncLi son's 
potential exposure, li- u e \ e r -••^.vue, d c j w J (K- outcome of the litigation hr •> an 
"interested,' " 'part)1 willui IIM • 1 •< 1 uj 
On the same f aus , Judge Anderson should have recused himself under Utah c 'od Ann 
§ 78-7- l ( l ) (c ) , which, provides that "except by consent, of all parties, no j u s t i ^ . j — c c . oi j j^uce 
, mi I id, r in,!1 ii .1 , 1, 1 • I1. .1 |ii.. a d u m " 'i. 11 1. Ih ii. 1 1 i:n .iltornev or counsel 
bThe law impales u, „^;g. , ».-c:^:; a,. - :.-dp. 01 ins ;:icn iu>- .f *.; : Smith v. Whatcott. 757 F.2d 1.098 
(10th Cir. 1985.) Judge Anderson's law firm rq *. - led defendant Syscom and its president, Mr. Rodney Hair 
in the purchase back of 40% of Syscom's stock from defendant Neal Sorensen. In advising Syscom on the fairness 
of the transaction, Judge Anderson's firm would presumably have assessed the proposed purchase price in light of 
Syscom's known liabilities and assets. Spector v. Mermelstein. 485 F.2d 474 (2d Cir. 1973); Hart v. Carro Spandock 
Kaster and Cuiffo. 211 A.D.2d, 620 N.Y.S.2d 847 (1995); Fisher et al. v. Reich et aL. 1995 W.L. 23966 (D.N.Y. 
1995). In a company then valued by the buyer and seller at approximately $180,000 (Syscom ultimately agreed to 
pay $72,000 for Mr. Sorensen's 40% ownership stake), the outstanding litigation with Cellcom, where at least 
$77,415.33 in mechanic's liens, plus statutory attorney's fees, were at stake, was a significant potential asset (or 
liability) that Judge Anderson's firm would have evaluated. The claims by and against Cellcom were, in fact, so 
significant to the value of Syscom that they were addressed in the Stock Purchase Agreement ("Agreement") that 
memorialized the transaction. (Agreement, at f 8; R. 1212.) 
After Anderson's firm's presumptive review of the pending litigation and determination of the likelihood of 
success, Syscom, through Mr. Hauer, signed the Agreement with Mr. Sorensen. Judge Anderson, as a partner at the 
time these services were rendered, is and remains jointly and severally liable for any potential claims ensuing from 
the firm's services, including evaluation of the likely outcome of this litigation. 
AH 
for either party in the action or proceeding." Judge Anderson is charged with representation of 
all clients of his firm. See Smith v. Whatcott. 757 F.2d 1098 (10th Cir. 1985). 
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(E) requires recusal when "the judge's impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned." Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(E)(1).9 The court's 
potential financial stake in the case and his firm's representation of defendant Syscorn and its 
President, Rod Hauer, a material witness in the bench trial, constituted grounds whereby the 
court's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 
Scott v. United States holds: 
The appearance of partiality prescribed by Canon 3(E) can never be waived by the 
litigants regardless of the immateriality of the Canon violation. Thus, the Canon 
recognized that some appearances of impropriety are so compelling that given the 
purposes of the Canons, they can never be waived or deemed harmless. 
Scott v. United States. 559 A.2d 745, 751 (D.C. App. 1988). The federal statute that parallels 
Canon 3(E) is not waivable except if, after full disclosure, the parties waive any appearance of 
impropriety or conflict. Potashnick v. Port City Construction Company. 609 F.2d 1101, 1114 
(5th Cir. 1980). No disclosure or waiver occurred here. 
9
 As Canon 3(E) is incorporated into the Federal Judicial Disqualification Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455, federal 
decisions interpreting the statute are instructive. The test for recusal under Canon 3(E) is objective. Liljeberg v. 
Health Servs. Acquisition Corp.. 486 U.S. 847 (1988). A judge must recuse from any case in which there is "an 
appearance of bias or prejudice sufficient to permit the average citizen reasonably to question [the] judge's 
impartiality." United States v. Heldt. 668 F.2d 1238, 1271 (U.S. App. D.C. 1981), cert, denied. 456 U.S. 926 
(1982) (footnote and citations omitted). The standard uis rigorous: [CJould a significant minority of the lay 
community . . . reasonably question the court's impartiality?" Reillv v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation 
Authority. 330 Pa. Super. 420, 458, 479 A.2d 973, 992 (1984). "The objective standard is required in the interest 
of ensuring justice in the individual case, and maintaining public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process 
which depends on a belief and the impersonality of judicial decision making.*" Scott v. United States. 559 A.2d 745, 
749 (D.C. App. 1988) (citations and footnote omitted). Neither bias in fact or actual impropriety is required to violate 
the Canon. Hall v. Small Business Admin.. 695 F.2d 175, 178-179 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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Recusal WHIS iniiJiridalnl siiiin'i , as Judpo Anderson apparently recognized, a fully-informed 
person might reasonably question whether the judge "could decide the case with aloofness and 
disinterest." Pepsiiu. *;.w • - McMillan. / 
months after his leavine private practice where his sole partner represented the opposing party, 
he made a series o r > -cuoua • mlings and decisions all of which were against Cellcom. The 
prepare. Significantly, he was the trier of fact, judging the veraciu of \\\ * w imesses representing 
S>scorn, his Lum >, u . ..w.*.. ...L ^ . mer preskk. :*...-.,„) i, c ui icnl 
pi . l • * - )r every cent ^ * *>^ - TT-> cd for. He dismissed the Syscom's 
breach of a contract a* de minimis Ik J-.-nic1 every post-trial motion ir its entiret" See 
•h 
and ongoing involvement with Syscom. (The stock buyout was amortized through 1996; R. 1206, 
1212.) I hese circumstances present "a situation in which the judge's impartiality might well be 
questioned Potashniik, <)09 1; ?d ;n I I lo 
The issue here is whether the firm's prior representation of Syscom, and its president, who 
was a trial witness, might cause a reasonable pcison lo iispi i I lliiiil llii iiiiil iiiiiiii III in I In 
impartial. This Court should require the trial judge to recuse himself. This Court should remedy 
the harm arising from, the trial court's failure to recuse by vacating the judgment. Liljeberg. 
supra i (us inttiuir i |i iiiiikiiiui ly np]iii»pi Lite hcuui ' * " 
Potashnick. 609 F.2d at 1115. Recusal should be ordered and the judgment vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
The court should reverse and remand with directions to dismiss Syscom's counterclaim, 
enter judgment in favor of Cellcom, and conduct a trial on Cellcom's damages. In addition, the 
court should order that Judge Anderson recuse himself, and vacate the judgment. 
DATED this / S d a y of October, 1996. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By /^C^UC/fJ^f^L 
Andrew M. Morse 
Julianne P. Blanch 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
N:\17838\5\AMM\BRIEF2.WPD 
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Andrew M. Morse, attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant, certifies that he served the attached 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AMERICAN K 
1
 i | ' h u f1 i, ii I " 'ii '' i tines thrrrnf in an envelope addressed to: 
< le F. McKeachnie, Esq. 
Clark B. Allred, Esq. 
MCKEACHNIE & ALLRED 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees 
363 East Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
and deposited the same, sealed, with first-class postage prepaid tlim-mi m ilu I limnl Sinh" M nl 
at Salt Lake City, Utah, on the /-T~day of October, 1996. 
/bk&i TotS<—^-
Andrew M. Morse 
ADDENDUM NO. 1 
MANAGEMENT CEMENT (EXHIBIT 75) 
s ^greemer - - -nterea this „..,„„„,., day ot _,,__» 1990, 1 
n
- between HntKiunn >n w H i in II MM i I i > il il il i i in i r . " C M I f O h " 
-wsiness address is 261 Hannover Circle, Panama City, Florida 32404 
HMMUMTCifiil TOM f ORPORATIGN f n i i *uJ 11 hi31 P I n is "SYSCOfT , 
-> A • i^sb <i^ ui esb i s i *.' 7 5 Eas t, SS!J L»ou I I •, 7e t iia 1 „ 'U"I • 11 U U i «" 8. 
A . IN „ .fc. . , .ui 11 II i II II in" II <JC1M I i< 1 
• . : \ . r i c 3 t i c n s C c m m i s s i i • • . * ' .» t\ "Jim ire line c e l l u l a r 
. • • ' w i I I > crvf? t h e l.i t a h - 5 
: r a i S-?rviCf- - •• - • ~ - I, I icr e i n a i t e r l - ' i Jnu i 
^ M ' ) c o n s v • i ' - i o f Gr anU, u.i.ei
 7 , Cu . r Lc : i , D u s c h e n e , U n i f a h , and D a g g e t t 
B * ' "" - f - T , SYSCOM has been i n t h e ccmmun i ca t i o n s b u s i n e s s i n t h e 
"'I'M f H P F H I in I | in H I i i, " i ) 'ea i s ,, ha\ i n g engaged ' i i t 
is, L a i l a t i o n ao<:: s e r v i c i n g i .i I I wo wa;y at id .Tiicn cwa * e ecu ipme i \t 
' t ' i 1 1 i o in i o f i p t i w t T i p a g i n g s y s t e m , a n d t h e l e a d i n g " »» 'i.in J U c a l i o n s 
1 i"-i 1 mi I 11 mi II II I i i il Il i 111 j ^ t j e * i I I I m * • I» 11 i 111 in i i I i 11'" i 1e r a b l e 
siness experience, name familiarity And husinesb hnuwleJye in I hp 
1'-criiiimiiin] r i r i nnr dm n , i t h e PERMIT i W f t ; i nd 
•I ¥4in KL«o , SYSCOfi h o l d s a n FLC p r i . n l n r a d i o l i c e n s e • 1.1 id i s 
c r e d i t e d by t h p N a t i o n a l A * s o c i a t i o n o f B u s i n e s s and R a d i o U s e r s ; at td 
III11 W i l l I ' M I I V ' I , , II II II III mi I l l r J i e " , II ii'ii'i r ' i f i l l f'" :»ii "".tent w i t h t h e 
2 e s a n d r e g u l a t i o n s of I he r r r , as an i n d e p e n d e n t c o n t r a c t o r I ^ ^ n ^ n p 
i ui1 if i "i n f in , p i ' i , it i mi i mi II „ p e r i o d i c
 r e < j e s i g n * n d m a i n t e n a n c e 
MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT 
E. WHEREAS, CELLCOM and SYSCOM desire to enter into this contract 
'or the purpose of advancing their mutual financial interests by utilizing 
ogether the PERMIT, knowledge, experience and assets of CELLCOM and the 
nowledge, experience, business and community contacts, and assets of 
YSCOM in order to engage in the business of providing cellular radio 
elecommunications services in the PERMIT AREA; and 
F. WHEREAS, SYSCOM and CELLCOM desire that SYSCOM sell cellular 
slephones, accessories and peripheral equipment in the PERMIT AREA which 
rtivity is expected to benefit CELLCOM and SYSCOM; and 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the above recitals and the mutual 
jreements herein contained, CELLCOM and SYSCOM hereby agree as follows: 
1. TERM 
The term of the Management Agreement s h a l l be f i v e (5) years 
mmencing on the day of , 1990 and t e rm ina t i ng on the 
day of , 1995, s u b j e c t to review on an annual bas i s . 
2 . GENERAL D U T I E S OF SYSCOM 
a. SYSCCM shall perform all services under this Management 
reement under a fiduciary relationship with CELLCOM in accordance witr. 
3 reasonable standards of honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and in a 
Sessional manner that will best serve the financial and business 
:erests of CELLCOM in the PERMIT AREA. SYSCOM's performance under this 
>agenient Agreement shall comply in all material respects with good 
iness practices in the industry, and shall be in compliance with all 
licable federal, state, and local laws, rules and regulations. 
b. Subject to CELLCOM's exclusive right of unfettered control 
r business assets, facilities, operations, and policy decisions, SYSCOM 
11# as an independent contractor, manage and implement all business 
i i t i v i t i e r . fui ilio operatiun f tlif ^aiJ business, including but not 
I 
ii tessai i l r limited Iti I Jm iulluuiJiy. 
( j j Operation of physical assets such as antennae, towers, cell 
s i tes, switches, transmission ! i DPS, spare parts, terminals 
and tests instruments; 
( i i ) I f an outside b i l l i ng company is not used, collection of 
payment and receivables from subscribers w i l l become 
SYSCOM's responsibil i ty, SYSCOfi w i l l be reimbursed $10.00 
per month, per subscriber j_ 
l Const r uc tijpii
 f m a i n t e n a n c e a n d r e p a i f I lit c e l l u l a r s y s t e m ; 
, i ) PPI f or mance o f f n l l u l u • y ^ t am P *J i i I i w t i ns 
I * J R e s a l e o f J M v ie M f r u m t h#* w i r e l i n e t . e i l u l a r 
t e l e c o n i m u n i t a t i o n s s y s t e m i f a p p l i c a b l e ; 
( v i ) N e g o t i a t i o n and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n nf < us t - e t f e c t i \/t 
i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n a r r a n g e m e n t s w i t h l o c a l w i r e l i n e t e l e p h o n e 
s y s t e m s , 1o111 d i s t a n c e c i r r l p r ^ and o t h e r c a r r i e r s ; 
( v i i ) P r o v i s i o n o f r u c h a s s i s t a n c e as t b L L t O M may r e q u i r e i n 
p r e p a r i n g r e p o r t s lo the FCC or s t a t e m d ln r - - * r**^ •-. t t ) r / 
a u t h o r i t i e s ; 
( v i i i ) C o n d u c t i o n o f p r i c e n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h s u p p l i e r s , <dener i L i c n 
o f p u r c h a s e o r d e r s , a p p r o v a l o f p a y m e n t s t o s u p p l i e r s and 
v p r i f i r i t i o n i f r e c e i p t r t m a t e r i a l ; 
( l ) F o r m u l a L i u i i n id I nip I unei i L a l i u n i I t j d J i J p t r a t . ' i j 
p r o c e d u r e s , i n c l u d i n g p r o g r a m s and r o l i e i e s to a s s u r e 
a d h e r e n c e t o s a f e t y , e n v i r o n m e n t a l and o t h e r r e q u i r e m e n t s 
u n d e r a p p l i c i b l p f i ' d m i ! , r t i t e i n d l ^ r a 1 1 iws and 
r e q u l a t l on*" ; 
( A ""I C o o r d i n a t i o n n l i I H | I I I I i» 1 i I n f i d \ HMMIOI 
p r o d u c t s ; 
( X L ) Negotiation =md acqu*-. l L*»-II uf apprc i i h i 
polici P C • 
0 
(xii) Coordination and negotiation with nf« ijhboring eel 11 1 n 
markets ; 
(xiii) Selection and acquisition of office facilities and of 
subscriber, ystem and office rquipnmnt and services; 
(xiv) Selection, ti lining and supervision nl technical, sales i~d 
administr ative personnel; 
( x v i ) Development, implementat ion and maintenance of f i n a n c i a l 
cont ro ls and procedures , i n c l u d i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h 
f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , to insure e f f i c i e n t c o l l e c t i o n and 
depos i t , investment and disbursement of funds i n the name 
ana on behalf of CELLCOM; 
( x v i i ) Development and maintenance of f i n a n c i a l record keeping 
procedures and maintenance of records of a l l t r a n s a c t i o n s 
r e l a t i n g to the c o n s t r u c t i o n and opera t ion of the System; 
and 
( x v i i i ) Performance of a l l o ther f u n c t i o n s cons is ten t w i t h the 
purposes of t h i s Management Agreement, 
c . Insofar as the o b l i g a t i o n s or r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of SYSCOM 
r e i n u n d e r r e q u i r e or permit SYSCOM to e n t e r i n t o t r a n s a c t i o n s on behalf 
CELLCOM w i t h SYSCOM, the terms and c o n d i t i o n s of such t r a n s a c t i o n s s h a l l 
on terms and condi t ions which are no more burdensome to CELLCOM than 
-LCOM c o u l d ob ta in i n comparab le t r a n s a c t i o n s entered i n t o w i t h p a r t i e s 
i e r than SYSCOM, 
3 . SPECIFIC DUTIES OF SYSCOM 
For the b e n e f i t s c o n f e r r e d and the compensa t ion to be p a i d to 
;COM h e r e i n a f t e r s t a t e d , SYSCCM s h a l l , a t i t s own expense , un less 
l e r w i s e s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e d , and s u b j e c t a lways t-p r?i * rrj±L*—cJL^jrvt of 
j^ j jmn' ng r-nnt- m l ^ n d approva l , d i l i g e n t l y p e r f o r m the f o l l o w i n g s e r v i c e s 
CELLCOM: 
a. Facilities Location and Acquisition SYSCOM shall be 
ponsible for the location and acquisition of space on towers and other 
ociated facilities (including microwave facilities) reasonably required 
accommodate equipment for the operation of cellular telecommunications 
/ices hereby defined to include, but not limited to, local exchange and 
srchange voice and/or data services, voice mail services, monitoring, 
/ices, as well as other related services which may lawfully be provided 
ir CELLCOM's PERMIT as it presently exists or as it and any associate 
ihalf of CELLCOM for additional tower sites and associated facilities, 
^eluding all terms and conditions of lease agreements or other agreements, 
ibject always to CELLCOM's final approval of any and all agreements. At 
LLCOM's cost SYSCOM shall recommend and arrange for purchase and 
istallation of all reserve, all battery, and such generator equipment as 
necessary and reasonable for all equipment facilities, 
b. Implementation of Business and Financial Plans SYSCOM shall 
plement a comprehensive three-year business and financial plan, provided 
CELLCOM, set forth in Attachment A, and shall assist CELLCOM in the 
neration of required information and in all other steps for obtaining 
stem financing. 
c. Sale and Installation of Customer Equipment SYSCOM shall 
rthwith establish and commence to operate a professional, ongoing, 
npetitive business for the sale, rental and installation of cellular 
Lephones, accessories and peripherals during the term of this Management 
"cement. See Attachment E, Sales Agent Agreement with attached 
nmissicn Plan for reimbursement of sign-up commission. 
d. Management and Performance of Maintenance Services SYSCOM 
ill assist CELLCOM in connection with the negotiation and implementation 
a Maintenance Contract to be executed by CELLCOM and SYSCOM for both 
Jtine and emergency maintenance and repair service required for the 
'rations of the proposed cellular telecommunications system. Service 
>vided by SYSCOM shall include, but not be limited to, the monitoring of 
maintenance performed on CELLCOM's system, analysis and review of 
ts, fees and charges, supervision of the actual maintenance work on the 
tern, performance of routine daily checks and inspections, and 
orehpn^wp rpnni^r narindin tiMtiina and alianment of the System 
rst class cellular system operation and service. At three month 
tervals, SYSCOM shall submit to CELLCOM a statement, patterned after 
tachment 8, attesting to the adequacy of such maintenance. 
e. Transition Services Within a reasonable time, or as required 
CELLCOM, SYSCOM shall provide assistance, counsel, advice, and 
operation concerning any transfer or relocation of equipment and/or 
orations that may be necessitated by termination of this Management 
eement. SYSCOM will provide its services to CELLCOM at their then 
dished rates. 
f. Bi-weekly Staff Meetings SYSCOM and CELLCOM shall participate 
bi-weekly, or as frequent as otherwise necessary, staff meetings (which 
be conducted by telephone conference call) at CELLCOM's offices or as 
erwise designated, the meetings, which are expected to have a duration 
one-half business day or less, shall be conducted in accordance with the 
lowing general procedures: 
(i) In order to efficiently utilize time, coth CELLCOM and 
SYSCOM shall, to the extent practical, limit to twc the 
number of their representatives attencing these meetings; 
(ii) SYSCOM shall prepare an agenda prior to each meeting that 
includes a listing of (a) all significant activities 
surfacing during the preceding two weeks; (b) all unresolved 
matters addressed during previous bi-weekly meetings; (c) 
all issues that may reasonably be expected to be of interest 
to CELLCOM; and (d) any other items deemed to be of 
sufficient interest to warrant attention at bi-weekly staff 
meetings. 
(iii) At each meeting an Action Item Listing shall be updated by 
SYSCOM, in order to provide current information regarding 
tasks assigned, progress made against previously assigned 
due dates, personnel responsible for various tasks, and 
tasks warranting further effort or direction. This Action 
Items List shall be formatted after Attachment C. 
complete list of all customers of the cellular system in a form patterned 
'after Attachment 0. Both parties agree the customer lists shall be the 
sole property of CELLCOM and upon the termination of this Management 
Agreement, it shall have the sole and exclusive right to possession and 
control of said customer lists, as well as all other listings and records 
of the system's customers, including any copies in whatever form and 
whereever the same may be located. 
h. Insurance SYSCOM shall require and maintain comprehensive 
casualty and liability insurance for all activities and equipment which are 
the subject of this Management Agreement. CELLCOM shall be named as an 
insured and SYSCOM as an additional insured. CELLCOM shall pay all 
lecessary costs for such coverage. Insurance policies shall be consistent 
<dth those set forth on Attachment E, or in a form acceptable to CELLCOM. 
SYSCOM shall assure that CELLCOM is provided with copies of all current 
policies within ten (10) days of their effectiveness. Liability limits 
shall not be less than $5,000,000 value. CELLCOM's name shall be placed cr. 
Lhe policy 3S a loss payee as its interest may appear. 
i. State and Local Approvals SYSCOM snail timely and in writing 
idvise CELLCOM of all necessary state and local authority required for the 
ronstruction, continuing operation, or additional construction of the 
System, and take all necessary actions to obtain such authority. 
j. Interconnection & Tariffs SYSCOM shall take all reasonable 
tnd necessary actions required to obtain and maintain system 
nterconnection and tariffs with the landline exchange carriers in the most 
>rompt manner possible. As appropriate, SYSCOM shall advise CELLCOM of 
lesired charges or advances in existing arrangements. 
k. Construction Supervision SYSCOM shall supervise construction 
f the cellular radio and microwave systems, and at all times keep CELLCOM 
^prised of the status of such activities, 
1. Access to "Pertinent Business Records SYSCOM shall provide 
:LLCOM with access, upon reasonable notice and at reasonable times, to the 
>oks and records maintained by SYSCOM with respect to the System, SYSCOM 
^cognizes CELLCOM's need to have the right to conduct full and complete 
dits without limitations, all at CELLCOM's expense. Any information 
quired during the course of such audits shall be protected as 
nfidential information under Section 8 of this Management Agreement. 
4
- RESOURCES TO BE DEVOTED TO THE SYSTEM 
In order to fulfill the obligations set forth in paragraphs 2 and 
above, SYSCOM shall devote, at a minimum, the following resources to the 
stem; 
a. SYSCOM shall devote the time, as necessary, of its Partners, 
il Sorensen or Rod Hauer, to the design and construction of the System 
.il the License is issued and their time 3S necessary to the management 
maintenance, operation and additional construction of the system, which 
e shall be reasonably split among the duties set forth in this 
agement Agreement and as otherwise necessary to accomplish the 
ectives of this Management Agreement. 
b* SYSCOM shall, at its own expense, provide a telephone line 
h a 'unique telephone number listed in the local telephone listings as 
telephone number of the Cellular Business. (CELLCOM will designate the 
3 of the cellular business which shall appear in the local telephone 
ting,) Such telephone line shall ring into SYSCOM's current system at 
current business location. SYSCOM's employees shall answer the 
y CELLCOM. SYSCOM shall, at its own expense, add additional cellular 
Lisiness telephone lines if SYSCOM's current telephone system is not 
jfficient to handle the volume of CELLCOM's telephone calls. 
c. SYSCOM shall utilize its current business customer service 
srsonnel or hire more quality personnel to answer CELLCOMfs telephone 
ills, and to service potential subscribers and subscribers* inquiries and 
:mplaints. SYSCOM shall provide a twenty-four access phone number for 
istomers and Roamer Activations. 
5. RESPONSIBILITIES OF CELLCOM 
SYSCOM's responsibility for overall system management shall be 
ily limited by the enumerated responsibilities of CELLCOM in this Section 
CELLCOM shall undertake and diligently perform the following in 
nnection with this Management Agreement. 
a. Site Selection and Acquisition CELLCOM shall assist SYSCOM 
the location and acquisition, including negotiation and contracting, of 
ace on tcwers to locate equipment for the rendering of cellular 
lecommunications services in the Permit Area, including but not limited 
„ preparing and executing all contracts and leases and other related 
ruments, and purchasing and installing all equipment required by CELLCOM. 
b. Contract Execution CELLCOM shall execute such contracts as 
s recommended by SYSCOM and which are thereafter approved by CELLCOM for 
s construction, maintenance and lawful operation of the cellular 
Lecommunications system in the Permit Area. 
c
- Payments CELLCOM shall make lease payments and debt payments 
telecommunications equipment necessary for the providing of cellular 
*vice in the Permit Area except for charges or costs to be paid by SYSCOM 
*suant to Sections 2, 3, 4 and 6 hereunder. 
d. Maintenance CELLCOM 3hall, with assistance from SYSCOM, 
jotiate and execute all contracts for maintenance and repairs in 
inaction with the system. CELLCOM shall pay for all necessary and 
quired maintenance and repairs on the cellular telecommunications system 
*ing the operation thereof, save and except for the services rendered by 
)COM in the supervision and performance of system maintenance and repair 
required by other provisions of this Management Agreement and the 
ntenance Contract. 
e. Technical Training CELLCOM shall pay all costs of technical 
ining to be organized, implemented and arranged by SYSCOM pertinent to 
MTSO (Mobile Telephone Switching Office) and associated cellular site 
ipment; however, SYSCOM shall utilize, if feasible, sales training, 
sonnel and material furnished by cellular system equipment suppliers. 
training hereunder shall be approved in writing by CELLCOM and shall be 
i in Utah, unless otherwise agreed to by both parties to this Management 
>ement. 
f. Access to Cellular System CELLCOM shall provice SYSCOM ten 
numoers for SYSCCM's use^J^v—trfre—^^^4^oxjjance^of^ Ji t^ —oki-i-g-a-liuit^  OT^BTV 
Management Agreement^ , SYSCOM shall pay all costs associated with such^ 
"(To) numbers except local airtime and local access charges. J SYSCOM 
1 not sell, lease or otherwise'^derive any revenue from the use of said 
(10) numbers. 
g. System Equipment Acquisition or Lease CELLCOM shall acquire 
urchase or lease the equipment necessary to implement operations of the 
ireline cellular telecommunications system in the PERMIT AREA and such 
Dment shall be made available to SYSCOM for its use in the performance 
its obligations under this Management Agreement and subsequent 
a. ""As compensation for full and proper compliance with the terms 
)f this Management Agreement, SYSCOM shall be entitled to the following: 
(1) A Service Fee to be paid via monthly payments of 
10,000.00 payable on the 15th day of each month during the term of this 
anagement Agreement. 
(2) Ten (10) percent of revenues from the system, after 
eduction of all federal, state and local taxes due and owing, which sum 
hall be paid on the 15th day of each month, and cover the entire prior 
alendar month. 
(3) In the event that CELLCOM enters into an agreement to 
3ll the Utah 5 cellular system or any part thereof, CELLCOM agrees to pay 
3 SYSCOM 5 (five) percent of the sales price in accordance with the 
allowing procedure. If CELLCOM receives the full sales price in cash at 
Losing, SYSCOM shall be paid 5 (five) percent of that amount 15 days after 
.osing. If CELLCOM receives less than the full sales price in cash at 
osing, SYSCOM shall be paid 5 (five) percent of the cash amount p3id to 
."LLCOM at closing within 15 days of that initial payment. Thereafter as 
LLCOM receives subsequent cash installments of the sales price, SYSCOM 
tall receive its 5 (five) percent share of those payments, within 15 days 
receipt thereof by CELLCOM. In the event that CELLCOM enters into a 
le in which cash will not be received from the buyer (i.e. a trade of 
llular interest) either at the initial closing or in subsequent 
stallments, then SYSCOM shall receive 5 (five) percent of the market 
lue (as defined in Section 24) of the consideration received by CELLCOM, 
thin 15 days of the closing of that transaction. V--' 1 
(4) Section a(l) and a(2) above shall be adjusted as the 
tablished to accurately determine reasonable compensation. CELLCOM and 
SCOM* both agree to an adjustment in compensation, if necessary, at three 
ith intervals in 1990, 1991 and 1992. 
(5) Each party shall reimburse the other for out-of-pocket 
senses by such party which are the responsibility, under this Management 
'eernent, of the other party, and which expenses have been incurred at the 
luest of the other party. Such reimbursement shall occur within ten (10) 
s following receipt of such invoices as supported by proof of payment. 
7. COMPETITION 
a. SYSCOM and CELLCOM recognize that SYSCOM is now operating a 
munications business that is not in direct competition with CELLCOM's 
iness as presently permitted under the applicable statutes of the FCC 
the State of Utah. CELLCOM and SYSCOM recognize that due to a change 
the applicable statutes and rules, after the date of this Management 
Bement, there may in the future be a possibility of competition between 
"OM*s present and future business opportunities and CELLCOM's present, 
ansion and future business opportunities made available by such changes 
intendments to the present rules and statutes of the FCC and the State of 
!• In such event and due to the foregoing, the parties hereunder may 
\ to be in competition. Should this transpire CELLCOM and SYSCOM shall, 
•ide of this Management Agreement, make every effort to negotiate in 
I faith and consummate a separate agreement between them to cover such a 
etitive situation. The negotiations of such agreement shall not, 
ctly or indirectly, interfere with, suspend, or correlate in any manner 
he duties, responsibilities or contractual obligations of each party to 
other as set forth in this Management Agreement. 
8 . CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION; INCLUDING THIS MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT 
Both p a r t i e s recognize t h a t i n performing i n accordance w i th th is 
lanagement Agreement i t w i l l be necessary f o r each to become conversant 
rfith c e r t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n - r e g a r d i n g • the bus iness of t he o the r t h a t i s not 
j e n e r a l l y a v a i l a b l e o r known t o the p u b l i c , o r t o p o t e n t i a l o r a c t u a l 
: o m p e t i t o r s , i n c l u d i n g b u t n o t l i m i t e d t o , i n f o r m a t i o n r e g a r d i n g the 
I d e n t i t y and i n d i v i d u a l needs o f customers and p r o s p e c t i v e cus tomers of 
^ELLCOM and SYSCOM, t r ade s e c r e t s , c o n f i d e n t i a l m a r k e t i n g t echn iques and 
: e r t a i n o t h e r c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g the bus iness a f f a i r s of 
>oth p a r t i e s . Each p a r t y e x p r e s s l y recogn izes and agrees t h a t i t wou ld be 
i n f a i r and i r r e p a r a b l y damaging t o the o t h e r were i t t o d i s c l o s e and/or 
lake use o f such c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n . Each p a r t y covenants and agrees 
h a t d u r i n g the term o f t h i s Management Agreement, and f o r a p e r i o d of one 
1) y e a r t h e r e a f t e r , whether t e r m i n a t i o n i s v o l u n t a r y o r i n v o l u n t a r y , i t 
i l l r e f r a i n f rom d i s c l o s i n g a n d / o r making use of any such c o n f i d e n t i a l 
n f o r m a t i o n excep t as may be necessa ry i n the per fo rmance of o b l i g a t i o n s 
ereunde*" or except f o r d i s c l o s u r e s to c o u n s e l : The covenan t : i n ^ri: 
e e l i o n are i n .add i t i on tc .;•.-/ o t h e r r e s t r i c t i o n on the d i s : cr. i -. >. \ '. ::•-. :•* 
o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g t h i s Management Agreement g e n e r a ! 1 / , 
h i c h may be r e c o g n i z e d under any a p p l i c a b l e law. A c c o r d i n g l y , the 
n e g a t i o n s s e t f o r t h i n t h i s p a r a g r a p h s h a l l s u r v i v e f o r one ( 1 ) y e a r the 
e r m i n a t i o n o f the Management Agreement r e g a r d l e s s of the b a s i s f o r such 
e m a n a t i o n . 
9 . GOVERNING LAW 
T h i s Management Agreement s h a l l be i n t e r p r e t e d a c c o r d i n g t o the 
j b s t a n t i v e l aws o f the S t a t e o f U t a h . SYSCOM and CELLCOM hereby agree to 
J b j e c t t hemse l ves t o i n personam j u r i s d i c t i o n i n U t a h . Any p r o c e e d i n g , 
rbitration, or otherwise, brought to enforce or otherwise interpret this 
anag6ment Agreement shall be instituted in the State of Utah. 
10. TERMINATION 
a. Termination by SYSCOM SYSCOM may terminate this Agreement 
>der the following conditions: 
(i) upon 10 days written notice to CELLCOM, if CELLCOM fails or 
refuses to pay any amount due and owing to SYSCOM under 
Section 6 hereof when due; 
(ii) immediately following the making by CELLCOM of any general 
assignment for the benefit of creditors, commencement by 
CELLCOM of any case, proceeding, or other action seeking 
reorganization, arrangement, adjustment or composition of 
CELLCOM's debts under any law relating to bankruptcy, 
insolvency, or reorganization, or relief of debtors, or 
seeking appointment of a receiver, trustee, custodian, or 
other similar official for CELLCOM or for all or any 
substantial part of CELLCOM's property; or the commencement 
of any case, proceeding or other action against CELLCOM 
seeking to have any order for relief entered against CELLCOM 
or CELLCOM's debts under any law relating to bankruptcy, 
insolvency, reorganization, or relief of debtors, or seeking 
appointment of a receiver, trustee, custodian, or other 
similar officials for CELLCOM or for all or any substantial 
part of the property of CELLCOM, and (A) CELLCOM shall, by 
any act or omission, indicate CELLCOM's consent to, approval 
of, or acquiescence in such case, proceeding, or action, or 
(B) such case, proceeding, or action results in the entry of 
an order for relief which is not fully stayed within seven 
(7) business days after the entry thereof, or (c) such case, 
proceeding, or action remains undismissed for a period of 
fifteen (15) days or more or is dismissed or suspended only 
pursuant to Section 305 of the Untied States Bankruptcy Code 
or any corresponding provision of any future United States 
bankruptcy law; or 
(iii) upon 30 days written notice at SYSCQM's sole discretion* 
b. Termination by CELLCOM CELLCOM may terminate this 
agement Agreement upon 10 days written notice to SYSCOM, under the 
Lowing circumstances: 
(i) the failure or refusal of SYSCOM to perform any material 
part of its duties hereunder and the continuance of such 
failure or refusal for more than 30 days following written 
(ii) the willful misconduct, dishonesty, gross negligence or 
gross misconduct of SYSCOM; 
(iii) with 30 days written notice at CELLCOM's sole discretion; or 
(iv) the making by SYSCOM of any general assignment for the 
benefit of creditors, the commencement by SYSCOM of any 
case, proceeding, or other action seeking reorganization, 
arrangement, adjustment or composition of SYSCOM's debts 
under any law relating to bankruptcy, insolvency, or 
reorganization, or relief of debtors, or seeking appointment 
of a receiver, trustee, custodian, or the similar official 
for SYSCOM or for all or any substantial part of SYSCOM's 
property; or the commencement of any case, proceeding, or 
other action against SYSCOM seeking to have any order for 
relief entered against SYSCOM as debtor, or seeking 
reorganization, arrangement, adjustment, or composition of 
SYSCOM or SYSCOM's debts under any law relating to 
bankruptcy, insolvency, reorganization, or relief of 
debtors, or seeking appointment of a receiver, trustee, 
custodian, or other similar official for SYSCOM or for all 
or any substantial part of the property of SYSCOM, and (A) 
SYSCOM shall, by any act or omission, indicate SYSCOM's 
consent to, approval of, or acquiescence in such case, 
proceeding, or action, or (B) such case, proceeding, or 
action results in the entry of an order for relief which is 
not fully stayed within seven (7) business days after the 
entry thereof, or (C) such case, proceeding, or action 
remains undismissed for a period of fifteen (15) days or 
more or is dismissed or suspended only pursuant to Section 
305 of the United States Bankruptcy Code or any 
corresponding provision of any future United States 
bankruptcy law. 
11. REPRESENTATIONS ANQ WARRANTIES OF CELLCOM 
CELLCOM hereby represents and warrants to SYSCOM as follows: 
a. Organization and Standing CELLCOM will be a corporation 
rganized under the laws of the State of Delaware and will be duly 
jalified to do business in the State of Utah. 
b. Power and Authority CELLCOM has full power and authority to 
instruct and operate the nonwireline cellular radio system in the PERMIT 
tEA and to perform the terms of this Management Agreement. 
C. Binding Agreement This Management Agreement constitutes a 
lid and binding agreement of CELLCOM enforceable in accordance with its 
d. Oocuments CELLCOM will deliver to SYSCOM true, correct and 
:omp^ete copies of its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws. 
12. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF SYSCOM 
SYSCOM hereby represents and warrants to CELLCOM as follows: 
a. Organization and Standing SYSCOM is a corporation duly 
rganized and in good standing under the laws of the State of Utah. 
b. Power and Authority SYSCOM has full corporate power and 
Jthority to execute, deliver and perform the terms of this Management 
jreement, SYSCOM has taken all necessary and appropriate corporate action 
) authorize the execution, delivery and performance of this Management 
jreement. 
c. 8inding Agreement This Management Agreement constitutes a 
ilid and binding agreement of SYSCOM enforceable in accordance with its 
rms. 
12. LIMITATION ON LIABILITY; INDEMNITY 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Management 
reement, SYSCOM shall not be liable to CELLCOM for any loss of damage of 
/ nature incurred or suffered by CELLCOM in any way relating to or 
ising out of the act or default of SYSCOM, or any employee of SYSCOM, in 
5 purported performance or nonperformance of this Management Agreement or 
f part hereof, except loss or damage to CELLCOM caused by SYSCOM's 
lful act, willful default, gross negligence or gross misconduct under 
s Management Agreement to the extent to which the same is not 
:overable by virtue of the insurance of CELLCOM. In no event shall 
;COM be liable for CELLCOM's loss of profits and/or other consequential 
s or damage, whether or not occasioned or caused by the act, default or 
ligence of SYSCOM, nor shall SYSCOM be in any way liable for any act, 
ontractor employed for the purpose of providing services to CELLCOM. 
YSCOM undertakes to use due care in the context of the available labor 
orce in the selection of persons, if any, hired for the purpose of 
roviding services to CELLCOM, but SYSCOM shall have no obligation, 
ssponsibility or liability of any nature whatsoever for any act or 
nission, tortuous or otherwise, of any person so hired. Except as 
therwise set forth above, SYSCOM shall not be liable for, and CELLCOM 
lall indemnify and hold SYSCOM harmless from and against, any and all 
images, liabilities, losses, claims, actions, suits, proceedings, costs or 
cpenses (including reasonable billed attorneys' fees and expenses) of 
latever kind and nature imposed on, incurred by or asserted against SYSCOM 
any way relating to or arising out of this Management Agreement or the 
sign, development, construction, operation or management of the 
nwireline cellular radio system in the PERMIT AREA. 
14. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
All disputes in connection with this Management Agreement shall 
settled by means of mandatory binding arbitration, specifying the 
ticing party's appointed arbitrator, designating with particularity the 
cts supporting the demand for arbitration and constituting the alleged 
sach, the legal basis thereof and the relief requested. Such notice 
all be personally served on the other party. The other party, upon 
:eipt of such notice of termination, serve on the initiating party a 
sponse to the notice of arbitration and shall also appoint and designate 
arbitrator. Within thirty (30) days after the designation of the two 
I arbitrators above stated, the two (2) arbitrators shall meet and agree 
a third arbitrator. Unless otherwise agreed, the three (3) arbitrators 
ill attempt to agree on a third arbitrator who has experience in the 
elecommunications industry. All costs of arbitration and reasonable 
illed attorney's fees shall be paid by the nonprevailing party. 
IS. CONTROL AND AUTHORITY 
a. Nothing contained in this Management Agreement shall be 
seined to constitute a surrender or transfer of control by CELLCOM of the 
Lght to operate the Utah 5 Cellular System. Notwithstanding anything to 
le contrary in this Management Agreement, CELLCOM shall have the sole and 
cclusive right to set rates or the cellular service to be provided and to 
:ercise final authority over all decisions concerning the construction, 
eration and maintenance of the cellular system in the PERMIT AREA. 
b. No persons working in furtherance of the performance of 
SCOM's duties hereunder shall be the employees of CELLCOM. All such 
rsons shall be SYSCOM's employees, representatives, consultants or 
ents. 
16. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AS AN ADDITIONAL AND/OR ALTERNATIVE REMEDY 
In addition to any other remedies available in law or equity to 
s parties in arbitration, the parties may have the right to enforce the 
vision of the arbitration panel or any other decision of competent 
thority through specific performance as an alternative and/or additional 
ledy, both parties recognizing that the unique services contemplated 
suant to this Management Agreement demand the availability of such 
ledy. 
17; NOTICES 
All notices, demands, requests, offers or responses permitted or 
ulred hereunder shall be deemed sufficient if mailed by registered or 
tified mail or by reputable overnight delivery services, postage 
paid, addressed as follows: 
To SYSCOM: 
Neal M. Sorensen 
President 
Systems Communication Corporation 
P. 0. Box 1818 -
Vernal, Utah 84078 
And to: 
SYSCOM*s designated counsel: 
Michael F. Morrone, Esquire 
Keller and Heckman 
1150 17th Street, N.W. 
Suite 1000 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
To CELLCOM: 
Dennis L. O'Neill 
President 
261 Hannover C i r c l e 
Panama C i t y , F lo r ida 32404 
And t o : 
CELLCOM's designated counsel: 
James Ireland, Esquire 
Cole, Raywid & Braverman 
1919 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W, 
Washington, D.C. 20006 
18. SEVERABILITY 
The invalidity or unenforceability of any particular provision of 
is Management Agreement shall not affect the other provisions hereof and 
all be construed in all respects as if such invalid or unenforceable 
ovision were omitted, however, both parties shall use their best efforts 
modify the offending provision to conform to the rules and regulations 
Lie preserving the essential benefits of this Management Agreement to 
c M' 
J 
19. NO WAIVER OF DEFAULT 
A failure by either party to take action on account of any 
>fault by the other party shall not constitute a waiver of any rights set 
>rth in this Management Agreement as they relate to future performance 
ider this Management Agreement. 
20. SUCCESSORS 
This Management Agreement shall be binding on and shall operate 
r the benefit of all parties hereto and their respective heirs, 
signees, assignees and successors in interest, including legal 
presentatives. However, this Management Agreement shall not be assigned 
thout the written consent of the Parties. Such consent shall not be 
reasonably withheld. 
21. HEADINGS 
Paragraph headings are provided for convenience only and are not 
>art of this Management Agreement. 
22. ASSIGNABILITY 
CELLCOM may assign its rights and obligations under this 
eement by giving SYSCOM written notice of such assignment. Upon thirty 
') days' written notice to SYSCOM, CELLCOM may assign all of its rights, 
ies and obligations under this Agreement to an affiliate or subsidiary 
CELLCOM, or any other entity in which CELLCOM has a contolling interest. 
other assignment may be made only with the prior written consent of the 
er party, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. 
23. INTEGRATION 
This Management Agreement contains all other agreements, whether 
tten or oral, except for the lease referenced in Section 3a, the Sales 
it Agreement and the Maintenance Agreement. This Management Agreement 
^ 24. MARKET VALUE 
At any time when it shall be necessary to determine the fair 
narket value of the System, the >8uy9r -and the Seller may by written 
agreement- determine the fair market value. If the Eftryei*—and the Seller 
ire unwilling or unable to make such a determination within 5 business days 
ifter either party receives notice of the occurrence of any event requiring 
he determination of fair market value, then the &i*ye^ and the Seller 
hall, within the 10 business days after the expiration of such 5 business 
ay period, each select an appraiser satisfactory to it and within 3 
usiness days after being approved, the two appraisers shall appoint a 
lird appraiser. Within 3 business days after the third appraiser is 
sleeted, the Buyer and the Seller shall each advise the other in writing 
lether the three appraisers are satisfactory to them. If either party 
dls to advise the other within such 3 business day period that the 
praisers are satisfactory, then the parties shall negotiate in good faith 
agree on three mutually acceptable appraisers within 5 business days 
ter expi ration of such 3 day period. 
Each appraiser shall have at least 3 years experience appraising 
llular telephone systems. In arriving at the fair market value of the 
stem, the appraisers shall use data collected from the sales of interests 
cellular telephone systems in other United States markets having a 
>ulation of comparable size to the market served by the System and which 
re occurred within the two year period. The System shall take into 
:ount relevant differences affecting value between the markets served by 
h systems and the market served by the System, and such factors as the 
unt of debt assumed by the purchaser of any such system, the amount of 
System's cash on hand, its account receivable and payable, and 
larket for cellular telephone systems serving rural service areas. The 
air-market value of the System shall be determined by disregarding the 
ppraisal that deviates to the greatest extent from the two remaining 
ppraisal's, and then averaging the two remaining appraisals. If the 
eviation among all three appraisals is the same amount, then all three 
ppraisals shall be averaged, as the case may be, shall constitute the fair 
arket value of the System and shall be final and binding on the parties. 
25, COMPLIANCE WITH FCC RULES 
Notwithstanding anything in this Management Agreement to the 
ontrary, both Parties agree that if any provision shall be deemed to be 
^consistent with or in violation of the FCC's rules, such provision shall 
null and void. In such event, both Parties agree to use best efforts to 
>dify the offending provision to conform to the FCC's rules while 
eserving the essential benefits of this Management Agreement to each 
rty. 
26. RELATED PARTIES 
Either party may enter into any reasonable agreement with a 
lated party or affiliate for the performance of services of the 
quisition of equipment or other property; however, each such agreement 
all be on terms no less favorable to the other party than could readily 
obtained if it were made with a person who is not the related person or 
filiate or partner of the other party. 
CELLULAR COMMUNICATIONS OF 
EASTERN UTAH, INC. 
Dennis L. O^Neill 
8y: 
President 
SYSTEMS COMMUNICATION 
CORPORATION 
By:. 
Neal M. Sorensen 
President 
ADDENDUM NO. 2 
SEPTEMBER 18, 1995 RULING; FINDINGS 
OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VERNAL DEPARTMENT 
AMERICAN RURAL CELLULAR, INC. : RULING 
a Delaware Corporation 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
SYSTEMS COMMUNICATION : Case No. 910800064 CN 
CORPORATION, a Utah Corporation, 
and NEAL M. SORSENSEN, an 
Individual, 
Defendants. : 
The above-captioned matter came regularly before the Court for Trial October 15th & 
16th, 1992. After hearing evidence and arguments of counsel, the Court made and entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and entered a Judgment on Defendant's 
Counterclaim for $116,040.96. The Plaintiff appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. The 
Appellate Court analyzed the case and remanded for express findings; 
1. The Trial Court was directed to make express findings on the crucial threshold 
issue of whether SYSCOM was a contractor under the Building Trades Act. 
2. The Court of Appeals also made direction for a factual finding of which charges 
would be lienable and which charges would be payable under the management agreement in 
the event the Court determined Syscom was acting as a contractor, did not fit any of the 
exceptions to the licensing statute and accordingly there were direction to make findings 
regarding the allocation of attorneys fees. 
This Court has carefully reviewed the transcript and the Court's own notes concerning 
the evidence adduced at trial and now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Syscom was not a contractor under the Licensing Statute. The record in this case 
clearly forms a basis for the Court's finding that Syscom was a participant in the permit 
company and not a contractor. In some instances, particularly relating to the actual physical 
construction, Syscom acted as an agent of the Plaintiff. References in the record are to the 
record of proceedings on appeal. The Defendant, Syscom, arranged the financing (found 
Motorola) pages 764 and 765. Defendant completed the interface with US West 
Communications, pages 775 and 776. Defendant did the electrical and telephonic systems 
engineering to get the complete system up and running. Defendant did whatever was 
necessary with Plaintiffs blessing assuming the complete permit company was online. 
2. The Defendant, Syscom, was to share in sales and was to be involved in the 
operation and maintenance after completion and operation of business. The Defendant also 
constructed the buildings, obtained permits, and acted in the physical construction as an agent 
of the Plaintiff. 
3. Neal Sorensen testified that he was excited about being in the cellular business and 
that O'Neal of American Rural Cellular sought Syscom out because they were in the radio 
and telephone business. Conceptually, it is important to note that Syscom became involved 
and acted with due diligence to help the Plaintiff get the company online. It would appear 
from the record, that Plaintiff had the winning lottery ticket and was under guidelines to 
complete the system and get it up and running within specified time frames. 
4. The work of putting together the cellular telephone company progressed and 
eventually, as the initial phase of setting up the cellular telephone system was nearing 
completion, one version of a Management Agreement was signed by Plaintiff and another was 
signed by Defendant. The parties went forward with the work as if they had agreed to the 
terms embodied in the Management Agreement. (T. 244-245, 247, 280-282). 
5. Under the terms of the Management Agreement, Syscom had the responsibility to, 
"manage and implement the building of the system and operating it once built". Those 
responsibilities included operating, servicing, and maintaining all of the towers, switches, 
terminals, and other facilities, sales and billing of customers, negotiating interconnections, 
arrangements with local wireline telephone systems, establishing written operating procedures, 
and selecting, training, and supervising technical sales and administrative personnel and many 
other duties. (T. 248-251, Ex. 1 and 75). 
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6. For performing these functions, ARC agreed to pay Syscom a "service fee" of 
$10,000 per month plus 10% of the revenues from the system, minus certain deductions for 
taxes. The $10,000 per month management fee, although not called that by the parties, was 
substantially a fee for radio and telephone engineering and management services (T. 127, 
240-241, Ex. land 75). 
7. Although the Management Agreement states that Syscom is an independent 
contractor, the agreement also states that Cellcom had the right to make all decisions and 
direct how the work was done in putting together and operating the telephone company. The 
parties1 actions indicate their recognition that ARC was in total control and could direct, and 
at times did direct, how work was to be performed and how the money was spent. (T. 133, 
134). For example, communications about the details of the work took place nearly daily as 
the work progressed and ARC directed Syscom to withdraw monies and send the money to 
ARC in Florida, which Syscom did in a sum of $118,156.60." (T 39, 85,' 105, 115-116, 244, 
254, 269-273, Ex. 1 and 75). 
8. Part of the money to be received by Syscom was Ten (10%) percent of gross 
revenue and in the event the cellular telephone system sold, Syscom is to receive five (5%) 
percent of the sales price. (T. 128, 247, Ex. 1 and 75). 
9. As Syscom went to work to put together the telephone company, Neal Sorensen 
and Marie Bagshaw, the contact person Syscom had with Arc, talked on the telephone three 
or four times a week, if not more often. (T. 85, 244). 
10. Syscom was to be paid a fee called a service fee for its work in creating the 
new telephone company, which fee was the same during the construction period and the 
operation period. (T. 122), (Ex. 1 and 75). 
11. Plaintiff breached its covenant of good faith dealing by ceasing to communicate 
with the Defendant when Defendant was attempting to finish the cell sites and operate the 
system. This failure to communicate commenced several months prior to the termination of 
the agreement by Plaintiff. (T. 51, 86-87, 299-301). 
12. Defendant breached the agreement by advertising a competing product, however, 
paragraph seven of the Management Agreement recognized that there would be some conflict 
between Systems Communications' existing radio business and the cellular business and 
entered into the agreement with this knowledge and expressed reference to that potential 
problem. The Court finds the breach to be minor. (T. 276-278, Ex. 1 and 75). 
13. The Defendant, Systems Communication Corporation, sincerely pursued the 
construction and management of the system in anticipation of and reliance on future 
expectations of profit. (T. 247). 
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14. The Plaintiff, American Rural Cellular, Inc., received a completed and developed 
system at a reasonable price and was satisfied with the product. (T. 101, 106, 143). 
15. The Sales Agency Agreement signed by the parties enabled Syscom to participate 
in the sale of cellular telephones and states that it would do so as an independent contractor. 
(ex. 23). 
16. Plaintiff was satisfied with how the buildings and towers were constructed. (T. 
106). Plaintiff and its engineers supervised SYSCOM and approved the disbursement of 
funds from the various accounts. (Ex. 1 and 75). 
17. The services performed by Defendant, Systems Communication Corporation, 
improved the liened properties and were reasonable. The charges for work performed both 
by outside contractors and employees of Systems Communication Corporation are'properly 
chargeable against Plaintiff, in addition to the 510,000 per month agreed upon service fee> 
(T. 240-241). 
18. There is owing to Systems communication by Plaintiff, the sum of 531,543.33 for 
work it did and hired performed and materials supplied for improvements on the property 
covered by the lien identified in the First Cause of Action. (T. 306), (Ex. 76). 
19. Three is owing to System Communications by Plaintiff, the sum of 523,136.17 
for work it did and hired performed and materials supplied for improvements on the property 
covered by the lien identified in the Second Cause of Action, (T. 306), (Ex. 76). 
20. There is owing to System Communications by Plaintiff, the sum of 516,439.33 
for work it did and hired performed and materials supplied for improvements on the property 
covered by the lien identified in the Third Cause of Action. (T. 306), (Ex. 76). 
21. The agreements between the parties included a provision that in the event of 
default that the defaulting party would pay the costs of enforcement including reasonable 
attorneys fees. (T. 325), (Ex. 1, 23, and 75). 
22. Defendant has been required to hire an attorney and to pursue its counterclaim in 
this matter in enforcing Plaintiffs obligation to make the payments it agreed to make under 
that agreement. (T. 325-327). 
23. A reasonable fee to be awarded Defendant work related to the lien foreclosure is 
$15,000.00. 
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24. Since the Court has expressly found that SYSCOM was not acting as a 
contractor, the Mechanic's Lien Statutes are not and were not relevant to this action (other 
than to secure Syscom's position as a tactical matter up front). 
25. Pre-Judgment interest is and should be allowable on the definite amounts 
determined. 
26. SYSCOM's attorneys fees are chargeable under the Management Agreement and 
the contract under which the parties operated as the Court finds that SYSCOM was "the most 
prevailing party" and is therefore entitled to attorneys fees and costs through the course of the 
Appeal. 
27. Based upon the record at trial, the Court expressly finds tHait"SYSCOMvs services 
performed were reasonable and outside and/or inside contract employee man hours were 
properly chargeable in addition to the service fees. The prior Memorandum of the Court 
insofar as the Findings and Conclusions are not inconsistent herewith are incorporated and the 
Court concludes, therefore, that SYSCOM is entitled to Judgment against American Rural 
Cellular as follows: First Claim 531,543.33; Second Claim $23,136.17; Third Claim 
$16,439.33; Commissions $2,376.92; Attorneys fees entire proceedings through the date of 
Appeal $15,000; Attorneys fees and costs incurred on Appeal and Post Appeal $22,744.76; 
Pre-Judgment Interest $39,913.05 for a Total Judgment in the amount of $151,153.56. 
DATED this / f day of September, 1995. 
BY THE CQ^RT: 
1/ JOHN SANDERSON; DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
-5-
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the f ^Tb day of September, 1995, true and correct copies 
of the Ruling were mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered to: Mr. Andrew Morse, 
Attorney for Plaintiff, at SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU, 10 Exchange Place, 
#1100, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 and to Mr. Gayle F. McKeachnie," Attorney for 
Defendants, at 121 West Main Street, Vernal, UT 84078. 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
m AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-J^foe**. 
AMERICAN RURAL CELLULAR, 
INC., a Delaware Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
RULING 
vs. 
SYSTEMS COMMUNICATION 
CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, and NEAL M. 
SORENSEN, an individual, 
Case No.: 910800064 CN 
Defendants. 
The Court entered its Findings in accordance with directions from the Court of 
Appeals in this matter on September 18, 1995. The Court further requested counsel for the 
parties to submit proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and has 
received various Motions from the Plaintiff who is unhappy about the Court's Ruling. The 
Court has carefully read the Motions, the Memorandums supporting the Motions, the 
Responsive Memoranda filed by the Defendant and additional Responsive Memoranda filed 
by the Plaintiff. The Court is now in a position to enter its final Ruling regarding this matter 
and will deal with the Motions in the order in which they were filed. 
1. Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial filed September 29. 1995 
The Court is of the opinion that Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 59 criteria have 
not been met. There is no Affidavit supporting the basis for the Motion. The Court 
recognizes Plaintiffs counsel was not trial counsel. However, Plaintiff seems to be arguing 
with the Court's interpretation of conflicting evidence. Plaintiff is also arguing factual 
matters which were unrefined at trial with facts they have learned through diligence 
subsequent to trial. 
The Court was in a unique position to hear the evidence at the time of trial. That was 
the time for the case to be heard. There is adequate evidence in the trial record to support 
the Court's Findings and subsequent Findings of September 18, 1995. For example, Neal 
Sorensen testified that he was excited about the cellular business (citations are to the 
Appellate record, 767), and that. . . ."Syscom was to manage aaf implement all business 
activities for the business operation (768).M 
Defendant arranged the financing (found Motorola) (764, 765 ). Defendant completed 
the interface with U.S. West (775, 776). Defendant made decisions about locating and 
serving the sites (762, 763). The only witness for Plaintiff, Marie Bagshaw, did not dispute 
those factual assertions at the time of trial. Plaintiff sued to rescind the agreement. 
Defendants anticipated future profits were to be lost if Plaintiff prevail. Plaintiffs counsel 
now wants to argue facts, later discovered through information obtained from his own client 
that are in dispute but not brought out at trial. The trial of this case took two days and is 
over. Plaintiffs Motion to Reopen is denied. Request for Oral Argument is denied. 
2. Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider Ruling Precluding Responsive Memoranda 
or Oral Argument on Proposed Findings filed October 11. 1995 
The Trial Court has broad discretion to control the proceedings and procedure before 
it. The Court could have made specific findings as directed by the Court of Appeals without 
any input from the parties. At the conclusion of the hearing determining whether there had 
been a settlement, the Court outlined, with consent of the parties, the simultaneous 
submission of Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Court considered 
those in its analysis and made its specific Ruling on September 18, 1995. In the Court's 
analysis the specific references were made to the record, the Court is of the opinion that 
there is substantial preponderant evidence in the record to support the Court's Findings both 
before and after the Appeal. Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider Ruling and for Oral Argument 
on Proposed Findings is denied. 
3. Plaintiffs Objection to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed 
October 12. 1995 and Request for Oral Argument 
For the reasons outlined in the Court's analysis of the first two Motions further 
extensive comment is unnecessary. The Court again is of the opinion that there is ample 
preponderant evidence in the record to support the Findings of Fact and additional Findings 
entered by the Court on September 18, 1995 all according to the instructions of the Court of 
Appeals. Plaintiffs objections to the Findings are denied. Request for Oral Argument is 
denied. 
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4. Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Judge 
While the Court is sensitive about the appearance of impropriety, the Court can't 
condone the untimely way the Plaintiff kept this knowledge under its hat until things began to 
go badly for it. Since the Plaintiff kept his hole card hidden so long, he can't now play it. 
The Court is of the opinion that the Motion to Disqualify need not be supported by an 
Affidavit under Rule 63 under this situation. 
The Court is of the opinion, however, that the appearance of impropriety 
disqualification is in fact waiveable and in situations where the Court has prior knowledge of 
the appearance should make a record stating the facts known to the Court to allow the parties 
to discuss the matter and waive a recusal on the record. In this situation, the Court had no 
knowledge of any facts later learned regarding the law firm's handling of the Escrow 
transaction. It seems apparent to the Court, however, that the Motion to Disqualify should 
be made at the time counsel became aware of or learned of the facts leading to the 
disqualification. I think the Madsen vs. Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association 
case is controlling. 
767 B2d 538(Utah'l988). 
Counsel for Plaintiff apparently had knowledge of the Beaslin and Anderson Escrow 
function in July, 1995. In all good sense, Plaintiff waited to play this card until it had an 
unfavorable Ruling. Plaintiffs Motion was not filed with knowledge of facts until after it 
had participated in a Motion and hearing to enforce a settlement agreement, prepared and 
filed its proposed Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, filed a Motion to Reconsider, 
filed a Motion for a New Trial, and Motion to Reopen the Case for further Fact 
Presentation. Almost 90 days had elapsed. Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Judge is denied. 
Request for Oral Argument is denied. The Court is of the opinion this is a borderline 
chicken shit Motion but because of the sensitive nature of the Motion, the Court will not 
award attorney fees. 
5. Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify McKeachnie and Allred 
The facts presented to the Court in the Memoranda submitted indicate no 
attorney/client relationship. There does not appear to be a conflict from the disclosures that 
were made and the Motion is not timely. Once again, presumably the Plaintiffs, Mr. O'Neil 
and Ms. Bagshaw, knew well of the communication made with Mr. McKeachnie's office. 
The Court feels that there was in fact no attorney/client relationship and therefore no 
conflict. The Court is disturbed again in this situation that Plaintiffs waited until they lost to 
raise the question. Motion to Disqualify McKeachnie and Alfred's Law Firm is denied. 
Request for Oral Argument is denied. The Court will award $1,000 attorney fees to 
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Defendants on this Mdtion if the time involved can be supported by Affidavit. 
From the Court's Ruling herein, the Court will now make, enter, and sign the 
Findings of Fact and conclusions of Law and Judgment heretofore submitted, and they are 
entered and filed herewith. 
DATED this ff day of November, 1995. 
OHN R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the ^1h day of November, 1995, true and correct copies of 
the Ruling were mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered to Mr. Andrew M. Morse and 
Julianne P. Blanch, Attorneys for Plaintiff, at SNOW, CHRISTENSEN, & MARTINEAU, 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor, P.O. Box 45000, Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5000 and 
to Mr. Gayle F. McKeachnie, Attorney for Defendants, at 121 West Main Street, Vernal, 
UT 84078. 
Dejmry Clerk 
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discuss the legal ramifications of those facts, even 
if they were true and even if they were introduced at 
trial, it is indeed too late to come up with that. 
Even if it was not too late to come up with it, 
there's no evidence to support it. And as Gayle 
recognized, this appeal bond issue is indeed 
premature. I suggest we simply go by the rules on 
approaching that issue. 
Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
I appreciate the way this matter's been 
argued, counsel. I suppose the first thing we need to 
do is deal with the recusal issue. I suppose if I 
find that I should recuse, probably I'm not in a 
position to rule on anything else. 
I allowed oral argument and the 
opportunity to give counsel full opportunity to be 
heard on that issue because I am concerned as a Court 
with that issue. I'm very sensitive about that issue, 
and I've indicated all along I have been somewhat 
distressed by how to deal with it. 
The Court has taken a good look at that. 
I have looked at some ethics opinions and I've tried 
to analyze it in terms of, first of all, I guess in a 
gray area where there's an appearance of -- an 
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appearance of -- impropriety, the Court should back 
out. The Court should always disclose that and talk 
to the parties about it. And I acknowledge that 
responsibility. 
I will also indicate that I have no 
knowledge about any involvement. Mr. Morse has talked 
about involvement, and I guess as I read the rules 
under the canons, the canons in the statute refer to 
the appearance of impropriety as relating to 
associations that are connected to the matters in 
controversy. 
As I read the Code of Judicial Conduct, 
canon 3, subpart E 1(b), it clearly talks about 
matters in controversy. Subsection F of that canon 
talks about where the Court has knowledge, and asks 
the parties about it or makes a disclosure, and the 
parties can waive it after consultation with their 
clients out of earshot of a judge that seemed to 
convince me that it is waivable. 
I appreciate the arguments of counsel, and 
in rereading the Madsen case, there are some things in 
that case, I think, that apply by implication, and 
some things that don't. If you also read the Scott 
case, the federal case cited by the plaintiff, there 
is a situation where the judge had an ongoing 
Page 49 
discussion with the Department of Justice about 
becoming employed with them. 
Let's take a look at the actual facts of 
what we have before us here. Counsel's noted at I 
guess one of the motions, one of the settlement 
argument motions, an exhibit was introduced which 
contained the escrow agreement. Apparently Mr. Allred 
of Mr. McKeachnie's office had drafted an escrow 
agreement between SysCom and Neal Sorensen. There was 
a paragraph in that agreement which named the law firm 
of Beaslin & Anderson. Frankly, the Court looked at 
the document the day it was introduced and didn't even 
make the connection then. Let's look at exactly what 
it was that Beaslin & Anderson was to have done. What 
was the connection? What was the relationship? 
I suppose first we can all agree that it 
was not the matter in controversy. There was 
reference in the agreement to this litigation, 
allocation of who was to pay for that and how the 
proceeds were to be divided between Sorensen and 
SysCom if the litigation was successful. 
But I think Beaslin acted in that case, 
and again absolutely I had no knowledge of this, and 
not even the day I read the document did a flag 
raise. What was Beaslin called on to do here? I 
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don't think he had a -- it was kind of like an 
escrow. He took the money; if the parties performed 
he was to deliver the stock. 
I don't know if that's the kind of 
involvement that contemplates the same kind of things 
that were wrong in Scott versus U.S. Seems to me 
Beaslin was acting as a fiduciary under that agreement 
drafted by other attorneys to simply do what the 
agreement provided, and it was no different than if it 
had been placed with a title company or a bank. I 
think Beaslin had a fiduciary duty to both parties; 
that the parties involved were SysCom and Sorensen. 
Had nothing to do with the matter in controversy 
before me. 
Even at that, and I guess the Court of 
Appeals is going to tell us, I'm of the opinion that 
that kind, that kind of an involvement, although it 
may create an appearance of impropriety, is of a nexus 
that would probably, I think, be waivable where the 
objection was raised so late in the proceedings. 
And Mr. Morse, I appreciate the fact that 
you didn't have a fast way to determine the 
information. I have suffered and dealt with this 
concept. I have previously ruled, and I apologize for 
my coarse, my country judge kind of language in that 
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ruling. But it seems to me that the fact, the motion 
was raised solely in these proceedings, but so much 
has gone before in these proceedings that it is 
waivable in this case, and that I don't think Scott 
versus U.S. applies. 
By the way, there's very little case law, 
and I'll note for the record that the federal rules 
and state rules are not identical. The judicial 
ethics rules are not the same in every state. So I 
guess this may be a case that the Court of Appeals may 
have to tell me that I was wrong. 
I think the language in this footnote in 
the Madsen case is important, though. Here the Court 
is citing State versus Neeley. This is footnote 5 on 
page 544 of the Pacific Reporter in the Madsen case. 
They tell us in close cases, 
disqualification is the favored course of action. 
However, disqualification is not automatic and the 
basis for disqualification should be thoroughly 
examined, especially in cases such as this which are 
at an advanced stage of the litigation process. And 
here they were talking about an allegation of bias and 
prejudice and not an appearance. 
Although the language there talks about --
and this is the language of the Court. It says: "An 
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appearance of bias or prejudice is sufficient for 
disqualification; but even disqualification because of 
appearance must have some basis in fact and be granted 
on more than mere conjecture and speculation." 
I think, counsel, that I'm going to rule 
that the motion to disqualify because of the 
appearance in this case, first because of the nature 
of the Beaslin relationship, and second because of the 
lateness of the time in which it was filed, are not 
going to be grounds for me for disqualify. And so I'm 
going to indicate that I'll rule in the defendant's 
favor on that, 
I think the statute, 78-7-1, that's cited 
also by implication talks about the prior association 
or the prior law firm association, the involvement 
being relating to the matter in controversy. I think 
the best course of action would be, obviously, and I 
think those are — and I think it's clear those are 
automatic. Those are just totally automatic. And the 
judge ought to know and the parties ought to know and 
everybody ought to know about that up front. 
Let me respond, Mr. Morse, to the rest of 
the arguments and the Rule 59 motions. I appreciate 
the fact that evidence you have discovered after the 
trial caused your client great distress, and you feel 
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1 like you haven't had your day in court. You're mad 
2 I about this, and I understand that. Where was all this 
3 stuff when we tried the case? I just have to say that 
4 the Rule 59 motion seems to me as based, and you're 
5 basing that on newly-discovered evidence which you 
6 couldn't discover through reasonable diligence prior 
7 to trial, Mr. McKeachnie has I think adequately 
8 pointed out that there were depositions, there was 
9 discovery. We tried the case in October, the case took 
10 two days, and these facts simply were not developed or 
11 presented in the record. 
12 Your Rule 59 motion and what you've told 
13 me here today, you take dispute with a lot of the 
14 findings. You take dispute or you talk about a lot of 
15 new issues. And I've gone back in your motion, your 
16 written motion, and gotten the transcript and read my 
17 notes, and I've read some of the record. And from 
18 what I heard at the trial, the record, I think, 
19 clearly supports the findings that I have made. 
20 There's direct testimony from Neal 
21 Sorensen that he was the finder of Motorola. He said 
22 he brought Motorola to this deal. Nobody refuted 
23 that. Ms. Bagshaw didn't refute it. And I can only 
24 decide these cases based on the evidence that's before 
25 me. If those facts were not developed at trial, they 
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